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The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case Study of Sex-
Segregated Public Education
Jill Elaine Hasday1
INTRODUCTION
For more than a quarter century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that sex-
based state action is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.  But the
Court has always been much less clear about what that standard allows and what it prohibits.  For
this reason, it is especially noteworthy that one of the Court’s most recent sex discrimination
opinions, United States v. Virginia,2 purports to provide more coherent guidance.
Virginia suggests that the constitutionality of sex-based state action turns on whether the
practice at issue denies women “full citizenship stature” or “create[s] or perpetuate[s] the legal,
social, and economic inferiority of women.”3  Yet the opinion does not begin to indicate how the
sex discrimination jurisprudence might implement this new standard.  In particular, it does not
tell us how to determine whether any specific practice deprives women of “full citizenship” or
maintains their “inferiority.”4
The answer to this question is far from obvious.  Indeed, even the large legal literature
that has long argued that constitutional law enforcing the Equal Protection Clause should be
structured around a commitment to combating “subordination” provides us with relatively little
guidance.  This literature would seem to have concerns importantly aligned to those that Virginia
articulates.  But it ultimately does not teach us much about how to identify the practices that
undermine women’s “full citizenship” or sustain their “inferiority.”5
This Article attempts to give some content to the framework that Virginia presents.  More
specifically, it explores how analyzing the historical record of a practice can inform an
investigation into whether, when, and why that practice is consistent with women’s “full
citizenship stature” or operates to perpetuate their “legal, social, and economic inferiority.”6
History is not the only source that one could use in considering how to give flesh to the
standard that Virginia suggests, and the social understandings and distributive consequences
associated with a practice over time cannot conclusively establish how a practice is currently1
7 See id. at 519.
8 Id. at 532, 534.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 532.
11 Id.
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functioning or should currently be regulated.  But examining a practice at some remove from the
present can reveal hidden dimensions of a problem and bring into sharper focus questions that are
obscured in contemporary debates.  A historical record can direct a Court’s attention toward
particular issues, uncover areas of concern, and illuminate factors that might be relevant.  This
Article takes the historical record of sex-segregated public education in the United States as its
case study.  That record is an especially apt place to begin because Virginia directly concerned
the constitutional status of a sex-segregated public school.7
The Article proceeds in two parts.  The first examines heightened scrutiny, “full
citizenship stature,” and “legal, social, and economic inferiority” as they appear and function in
the Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence.8  The second considers how the historical record of
sex-segregated public education might help us learn what we would need to know in order to
determine whether, when, and why the practice of sex-segregated public education denies women
“full citizenship stature” or “create[s] or perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic inferiority
of women.”9
As we will discover, the record of sex-segregated public education over time suggests
that Virginia’s “full citizenship” standard may ultimately challenge many of the assumptions on
which the current sex discrimination jurisprudence is based, including some endorsed in Virginia
itself.10  For example, Virginia, like the sex discrimination case law before it, appears to treat the
claims of different populations of women as constitutionally interchangeable.  But the historical
record of sex-segregated public education reveals that practices can deny “full citizenship” to one
set of women and not another, or can deprive different groups of women of “full citizenship” in
different ways.11  The practice of sex-segregated public education, for instance, has historically
been entangled in both racial and class stratification, and has inflicted injuries on women that
varied depending on their racial and economic status.  This suggests that a decisionmaker
regulating single-sex public schools under the framework Virginia outlines would be well-
advised to consider whether some or all of those schools have different consequences for
different groups of women.
Similarly, the current sex discrimination jurisprudence focuses on separation as the
mechanism through which inequality is maintained, perhaps because this mechanism has
featured so prominently in the history of race discrimination in the United States.  The sex
discrimination case law seems to assume, for example, that sex-segregated and coeducational
public education are wholly different practices, directing constitutional scrutiny at the former
while all but ignoring the possibility that coeducational public schools might operate to
undermine women’s equal citizenship.
Yet the historical record of sex-segregated (and coeducational) public education makes
clear that separation of the sexes is not the only means by which practices can deprive women of
12 Id. at 532, 534.
13 Id.
14 Id. (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 532.
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“full citizenship” and sustain their “inferiority.”12  Some of the same mechanisms of inferiority
can function in both sex-segregated and coeducational public schools.  Indeed, the historical
record reveals that differences of form like that between sex-segregated and coeducational public
education can actually prove relatively unimportant in terms of their substantive impact on
women’s status. Through at least the first half of the twentieth century, for instance, sex-
segregated public education was systematically structured to steer and push women toward
marriage and motherhood and to discourage and disable them from pursuing prominent
participation in economic or political affairs.  This feature of the practice, which we might call
“sex role confinement,” did not depend on separation, however.  Role confinement was present
in approximately equal measure in the coeducational public schools of the period.
This suggests that a Court considering whether all sex-segregated public education should
be constitutionally prohibited under Virginia’s framework—a question that the Court has yet to
decide—could usefully compare the practices of sex-segregated and coeducational public
education.  Presumably, a Court would be unwilling to categorically ban coeducational public
schooling.  But if the practices of sex-segregated and coeducational public education turn out to
be operating with equal effect to maintain women’s “legal, social, and economic inferiority,” it is
hard to see why a jurisprudence committed to women’s “full citizenship” would want to
emphasize form by absolutely prohibiting sex-segregated public schooling, or how transferring
all public school students to coeducational schools would advance women’s “full citizenship
stature” and fight their “inferiority.”13  Along the same lines, this record also suggests that if sex-
segregated public education is not absolutely prohibited under Virginia’s framework, a Court
determining what constitutional regulations would best prevent single-sex public schools from
undermining women’s equal citizenship should consider the potential problem of role
confinement.  Similarly, a Court interested in protecting women’s equal status would be wise to
focus much more constitutional scrutiny on coeducational public schools directly, examining
them also as possible sources of women’s inequality.
Finally, the Virginia opinion appears to express a particular constitutional interest in
women’s “full citizenship stature” and “the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”14 
But prior sex discrimination cases, and parts of Virginia, treat men and women interchangeably. 
For instance, all of the Court’s opinions on sex-segregated public education are committed to the
proposition that single-sex public schools—whether they enroll male or female students—must
conform to separate but equal standards by not excluding a sex of students that lacks access to
equal public educational opportunities elsewhere in the jurisdiction.  The historical record of sex-
segregated public education, however, reveals that a practice that functions to deprive women of
“full citizenship” may not necessarily inflict the same harms on men.15  For example, women’s
exclusion from men’s public schools, when women did not have the same opportunities available
elsewhere, has often caused women to suffer serious dignitary and material harm.  But it is not at
16 Id.
17 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
18 Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
19 429 U.S. at 190.
20 See id. at 197.
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all clear that men’s exclusion from women’s public schools (when they did not have same
opportunities available elsewhere) has historically operated to impinge upon the “full
citizenship” of either men or women.16  This suggests that separate but equal standards may not
always be needed to prevent sex-segregated public schools from denying equal citizenship,
although the Court may remain committed to those standards as a required constitutional
minimum for other reasons.  More generally, it suggests that a Court applying Virginia’s
framework could usefully consider the possibility that a practice may have a different effect and
meaning for women and men.
Before we explore the potential uses of history in more detail, however, let’s begin by
examining the current, uneasy state of the constitutional law of sex discrimination.
I. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY, “FULL CITIZENSHIP STATURE,” AND “LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND
ECONOMIC INFERIORITY”
A. The Uncertain Reach and Reasoning of Heightened Scrutiny
In 1976, the Supreme Court determined that sex-based state action would be subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, meaning
that it would be held unconstitutional unless it served “important governmental objectives” and
was “substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”17  This was an intermediate
standard of constitutional review, deliberately situated between rational basis analysis, which
almost always upholds the constitutionality of challenged actions, and strict scrutiny, which
almost always strikes practices down.  How heightened scrutiny would draw the line between
constitutional and unconstitutional activity was, accordingly, a particularly pressing question
from the start.  But over the course of more than a quarter century, the sex discrimination
jurisprudence has remained noticeably unclear on this issue.
The sex discrimination case law has established that its concern centers narrowly on state
action that explicitly distinguishes based on sex.  Facially neutral state action is subject to
heightened scrutiny only if the plaintiff can prove the equivalent of legislative malice: “that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” women or men.18  The Court, however, has
offered much less guidance as to which forms of explicit sex-based state action violate equal
protection.
One theme emphasized in the case law stresses that the constitutional claims of men and
women are interchangeable.  Consider, for instance, Craig v. Boren,19 the case that the Court
selected for its announcement that heightened scrutiny would apply to sex-based state action.20 
21 Id. at 191-92.  For some additional examples of successful sex discrimination suits that
featured male plaintiffs, see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994); Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720, 723 (1982); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446
U.S. 142, 143, 147 (1980); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 271 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1977) (plurality opinion).
22 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 131.
23 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
24 Id.
25 Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 217 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
26 See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 (“[W]e are faced with the question whether the Equal
Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender [‘in the exercise of
peremptory challenges’] . . . . We hold that gender . . . is an unconstitutional proxy for juror
competence and impartiality.”); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981) (“[W]e consider
the constitutionality of a now superseded Louisiana statute that gave a husband, as ‘head and master’
of property jointly owned with his wife, the unilateral right to dispose of such property without his
spouse’s consent.  [We] [c]onclud[e] that the provision violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); Wengler, 446 U.S. at 144-46, 152 (“[Under § 287.240,] a widower
is not entitled to death benefits unless he either is mentally or physically incapacitated from wage
earning or proves actual dependence on his wife’s earnings.  In contrast, a widow qualifies for death
benefits without having to prove actual dependence on her husband’s earnings. . . . [W]e conclude
that the Supreme Court of Missouri erred in upholding the constitutional validity of § 287.240.”);
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 78, 89 (1979) (“Section 407 of the Social Security Act . . .
provides benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived of parental support
because of the unemployment of the father, but does not provide such benefits when the mother
5
Craig, the foundational case in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of sex discrimination,
involved a male plaintiff rather than a woman.  It addressed, moreover, an issue of little, if any,
relevance to women’s status in society: the right of young men to buy “‘nonintoxicating’ 3.2%
beer” at the same age that young women could purchase it.21
Another theme visible in the sex discrimination jurisprudence condemns what the Court
calls “invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and
women,”22 “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females,”23 “archaic and
stereotypic notions,”24 or “‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations.”25  The concern here appears
to be with legal practices that separate men and women based on beliefs about their respective
abilities or preferences that are inaccurate in the sense that they do not correctly describe every
man or every woman, although they may be true about most (or almost all) men or women.  By
repeatedly characterizing such practices as archaic—even when they accurately classify vast
numbers of present-day citizens—the Court’s statements suggest that these practices are
completely at odds with the modern sex discrimination jurisprudence and not to be tolerated. 
Drawing on this theme, the Court has struck down a wide variety of sex-based legal
classifications under heightened scrutiny,26 with the exceptions generally tending to cluster
becomes unemployed. . . . We conclude that the gender classification of § 407 . . . . cannot survive
scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); Caban, 441 U.S. at 386-87, 394
(“[A]n unwed mother has the authority under New York law to block the adoption of her child
simply by withholding consent.  The unwed father has no similar control over the fate of his child,
even when his parental relationship is substantial—as in this case.  He may prevent the termination
of his parental rights only by showing that the best interests of the child would not permit the child’s
adoption by the petitioning couple. . . . We conclude that this undifferentiated distinction between
unwed mothers and unwed fathers, applicable in all circumstances where adoption of a child of theirs
is at issue, does not bear a substantial relationship to the State’s asserted interests.”); Orr, 440 U.S.
at 270-71 (“The question presented is the constitutionality of Alabama alimony statutes which
provide that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce. . . . We now
hold the challenged Alabama statutes unconstitutional . . . .”); Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 201-02 (“Under
the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits (OASDI) program, survivors’
benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband covered by the Act are payable to his widow.
Such benefits on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife covered by the Act are payable to the
widower, however, only if he ‘was receiving at least one-half of his support’ from his deceased
wife. . . . A three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the different
treatment of men and women mandated by § 402(f)(1)(D) constituted invidious discrimination
against female wage earners by affording them less protection for their surviving spouses than is
provided to male employees . . . . We affirm.”) (citations omitted).
27 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-68 (1983) (upholding legislation that
“guarantees to certain people the right to veto an adoption and the right to prior notice of any
adoption proceeding.  The mother of an illegitimate child is always within that favored class, but
only certain putative fathers are included.”); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 466, 472-
73 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“[California’s statutory rape law] makes men alone criminally liable
for the act of sexual intercourse. . . . We hold that such a statute is sufficiently related to the State’s
objectives to pass constitutional muster.  Because virtually all of the significant harmful and
inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, a legislature
acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few
of the consequences of his conduct.”); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 348-49, 355 (1979)
(plurality opinion) (“Under [Georgia law], the mother of an illegitimate child can sue for the
wrongful death of that child. . . . A father who has not legitimated a child, however, is precluded
from maintaining a wrongful-death action. . . . [T]he Georgia statute does not invidiously
discriminate against the appellant simply because he is of the male sex.  The fact is that mothers and
fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated. . . . Unlike the mother of an illegitimate
child whose identity will rarely be in doubt, the identity of the father will frequently be unknown.”).
For a prominent recent example of this mode of reasoning, see Tuan Anh Nguyen v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 58-60 (2001) (“We hold that § 1409(a) is
consistent with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. . . . [, although it] imposes a set of
6
around sex-specific rules that the Court understands to be inseparably tied to the gestational
capacity that all women (presumptively) possess.27
requirements on the children of citizen fathers born abroad and out of wedlock to a noncitizen
mother that are not imposed under like circumstances when the citizen parent is the mother.”); id.
at 62 (“The first governmental interest to be served is the importance of assuring that a biological
parent-child relationship exists.  In the case of the mother, the relation is verifiable from the birth
itself. . . . In the case of the father, the uncontestable fact is that he need not be present at the birth.”);
id. at 64-65 (“The second important governmental interest furthered in a substantial manner by §
1409(a)(4) is the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen parent have some
demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop . . . the real, everyday ties that provide a connection
between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.  In the case of a citizen mother and
a child born overseas, the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child
inheres in the very event of birth, an event so often critical to our constitutional and statutory
understandings of citizenship. . . . The same opportunity does not result from the event of birth, as
a matter of biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed father.”) (citation omitted).
28 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
29 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
30 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
31 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682 (“[A]ppellants contend that classifications based upon sex,
like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must
therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.  We agree . . . .”); id. at 688 (“[W]e can only
conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or
national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”).
32 Id. at 686.  Along the same lines, the Frontiero plurality explained that “what differentiates
sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the
recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society.”  Id.
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A third theme in the case law hinges on an analogy to race discrimination.  This line of
reasoning emerged early in the sex discrimination jurisprudence, in Frontiero v. Richardson
(1973).28  Frontiero was decided two years after the Supreme Court first struck down a statute on
the ground that it denied women the equal protection of the laws,29 but before Craig held that
heightened scrutiny would apply to sex-based state action.30  The four-Justice plurality opinion in
Frontiero contended that sex-based state action should be subject to the same strict scrutiny
standard applied to race-based state action,31 and repeatedly compared sex and race
discrimination.  It noted, for instance, that “sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth.”32  In drawing this analogy, the opinion
never focused on the particular situation of women of color.  Instead, it used white women to
represent all women, and then compared white women to black men.  For example, the opinion
analogized the history of (white) women and (male) African-Americans, briefly recounting that:
throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in
many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. 
33 Id. at 685.
34 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (“As a plurality of this
Court observed in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 685: ‘[T]hroughout much of the 19th
century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks
under the pre-Civil War slave codes.’”); id. (“Certainly, with respect to jury service,
African-Americans and women share a history of total exclusion, a history which came to an end for
women many years after the embarrassing chapter in our history came to an end for
African-Americans.”); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (“With respect to
appellee’s second contention [that ‘conscientious objectors are a suspect class deserving special
judicial protection’], we find the traditional indicia of suspectedness lacking in this case.  The class
does not possess an ‘immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth,’ Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 686 . . . .”).
35 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36 See id. at 493-95.
37 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (“Just as the State may not, absent
extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its . . . schools, Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its citizens
into different voting districts on the basis of race.”); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
276 (1986) (“Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students are better off with black
teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (Brown I ).”); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983) (“An
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Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their
own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to
hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children.33
Ultimately, of course, the Court decided to apply intermediate rather than strict scrutiny to
sex-based state action, which suggested that sex discrimination was not quite analogous to race
discrimination and of lesser constitutional concern for that reason.  But the Court has continued
to employ the comparison between race and sex discrimination as a prominent explanation for
why sex discrimination merits special constitutional scrutiny, returning to this contention
repeatedly in the years since Craig.34
Against this background, one might expect the Court to have, for instance, easily struck
down all forms of sex-segregated public education under heightened scrutiny.  Single-sex public
schooling, after all, explicitly distinguishes between students based on sex, and has no obvious
connection to gestation or to any other fact about the body universally true of all men or all
women.  What’s more, the potential analogy to race discrimination could not be clearer or more
patently available.  In Brown v. Board of Education (1954),35 the Supreme Court famously held
that racial segregation in public schools is always unconstitutional, whether or not the excluded
race has access to public educational opportunities that are “separate but equal” in resources,
facilities, and other material advantages.36  Since Brown, racial segregation in public education
has become the Court’s paradigm example of unconstitutional race discrimination.37
unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of Education establishes beyond doubt this Court’s
view that racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as
well as rights of individuals.”).
38 For this reason, I do not find Mary Anne Case’s recent argument about the current state of
the sex discrimination jurisprudence to be fully persuasive.  On her account, the Court’s sex
discrimination case law is governed by a clear, established, and unwavering principle: The Court will
only uphold sex-based state action where “the assumption at the root of the sex-respecting rule [is]
true of either all women or no women or all men or no men; there must be a zero or a hundred on
one side of the sex equation or the other.”  Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law
Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1447, 1449-50 (2000); see also id. at 1457 (“Descriptively, while I do not claim that the
perfect proxies the Court found are good ones, I do claim (1) that the majority found a perfect proxy
in every sex-respecting rule the Court upheld since Frontiero, and (2) for every sex-respecting rule
struck down since Frontiero, no perfect proxy, even a farfetched one, occurred to the court, or to
me.”).  It is not at all obvious that the constitutional law of sex-segregated public education can be
characterized in these terms, however.  As mentioned above, sex-segregated schooling seems to have
no apparent connection to gestation or to facts about the body that are universally true of all men or
all women.  According to Case’s account of the sex discrimination jurisprudence, it should have been
easy for the Court to categorically prohibit all forms of sex-segregated public education (with the
possible exception of something like sex-segregated public education geared to pregnant students).
Yet the Court does not seem to agree that sex-segregated public education presents an easy case
under heightened scrutiny.
39 Before the Supreme Court established heightened scrutiny for sex-based state action, or
struck down any statute on the ground that it represented unconstitutional sex discrimination, the
Court summarily affirmed a district court judgment upholding the exclusion of men from Winthrop
College under rational basis review.  See Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S. 951, 951 (1971) (mem.),
aff’g 316 F. Supp. 134, 135-38 (D.S.C. 1970).
40 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
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Yet the constitutional law of sex-segregated public education actually constitutes a
striking example of the Court’s continued uncertainty about which forms of sex-based state
action are unconstitutional under heightened scrutiny, and why.  Although the Court has
desegregated some single-sex public schools, it has always done so on the ground that the
particular school in question violated the requirements of even a separate but equal regime,
excluding students based on sex when the students did not have access to equal public
educational opportunities elsewhere in the jurisdiction.  The Court, moreover, has explicitly
avoided making any judgments about the constitutionality of sex-segregated public education
under conditions of material parity, strongly suggesting that it believes that this form of sex-
based state action presents a difficult constitutional question.  At the same time, the Court has
been unable to explain the source of that intuition.38
Consider the first two of the Supreme Court’s three cases on sex-segregated public
education under heightened scrutiny.39  In the first case, Vorchheimer v. School District (1977),40
41 See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 880-81 (3d Cir. 1976).
42 See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 327, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
43 See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 882 (“The courses offered by the two schools are similar and
of equal quality.  The academic facilities are comparable, with the exception of those in the scientific
field where Central’s are superior.  The district court concluded ‘that [generally] the education
available to the female students at Girls is comparable to that available to the male students at
Central.’”); id. (“A fair summary of the parties’ positions, therefore, is that: . . . the schools for boys
and girls are comparable in quality, academic standing, and prestige . . . .”).
44 In truth, this factual conclusion was highly suspect, grounded in a casual and cursory
interpretation of separate but equal principles.  As its very name implies, Central High School, the
first public high school in Philadelphia and one of the earliest public high schools in the United
States, see Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 328; infra text accompanying notes 100-102, was at the
pinnacle of Philadelphia’s educational system in a way that the High School for Girls was not.  The
district court’s own opinion in Vorchheimer suggested that Central High had more programs, more
facilities, more qualified teachers, more books, more financial support, more prestige, and more
prominent alumni than its female counterpart.  See Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 328-29; see also
Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682, 685-92, 696-99, 703-04 (C.P. Phila. County
1983) (elaborating on these disparities), appeal from final adjudication quashed, 478 A.2d 1352 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984); FRANKLIN SPENCER EDMONDS, HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL OF
PHILADELPHIA  83 (1902) (providing a book-length account of the resources and illustrious history
of Central High School that describes, for example, Central High’s observatory, “the fourth oldest
in America”).
45 See Vorchheimer, 430 U.S. at 703.  “MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case,” leaving only eight Justices remaining.  Id.
46 See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 881, 886.  Female students would not gain access to Central
High School until they went to Pennsylvania state court in 1983.  In this second suit, the plaintiffs
again argued that the High School for Girls failed to offer women equivalent educational
opportunities.  See Newberg, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d at 683-84.  In this case, however, the court conducted
a much more rigorous separate but equal analysis and desegregated Central High, holding that
Vorchheimer’s counsel had provided such materially inadequate representation in developing the
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Susan Lynn Vorchheimer challenged the exclusion of female students from Central High School,
an academically elite and selective public high school for boys in Philadelphia.41  By the time the
case reached the Supreme Court, a district court had found,42 and an appeals court had agreed,43
that the educational opportunities available to male students at Central High were “comparable”
to those available to female students at the Philadelphia High School for Girls, the only other
academically elite and selective public high school in Philadelphia.44  The Supreme Court chose
Vorchheimer for its first consideration of sex-segregated public education under heightened
scrutiny, but could not decide the case.  The Court split four-to-four in Vorchheimer, without
issuing any opinions.45  The Third Circuit’s judgment, which had upheld women’s exclusion
from Central High,46 was just affirmed automatically on the basis of the divided vote.47
facts of the case that the plaintiffs in the state suit could not be bound by the earlier factual findings.
See id. at 702-07, 711-12.
47 See Vorchheimer, 430 U.S. at 703.
48 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
49 Id. at 720 n.1 (“Mississippi maintains no other single-sex public university or college.
Thus, we are not faced with the question of whether States can provide ‘separate but equal’
undergraduate institutions for males and females.  Cf. Vorchheimer v. School District of
Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (CA3 1975), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).”).
In his dissent in Hogan, Justice Blackmun indicated that he would uphold the constitutionality of
sex-segregated public education that was “‘separate but equal.’”  Id. at 734 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (complaining that the majority opinion in Hogan “places in constitutional jeopardy any
state-supported educational institution that confines its student body in any area to members of one
sex, even though the State elsewhere provides an equivalent program to the complaining applicant”).
50 The opinion did not elaborate much on what “‘separate but equal’” standards required, but
it explained that those principles were violated in this case because Mississippi operated no all-male
nursing school and its coeducational nursing programs were located “a considerable distance from”
the male plaintiff’s home.  Id. at 720 & n.1, 723 & n.8.  The Court limited its opinion to the School
of Nursing in particular, without addressing the admissions policies for the rest of the Mississippi
University for Women.  See id. at 723 n.7.
51 The impulse to assert that women have consensually agreed to the status they occupy is
deeply rooted in American law and society and appears in a wide variety of contexts.  For example,
I recently explored contemporary debates over the legal status of marital rape.  People on both sides
of these debates consistently assume that the law’s protection of marital rape did not become
controversial until the late twentieth century.  Although the historical record clearly contradicts that
notion, its prevalence reflects and draws strength from a common presumption holding that long-
established aspects of women’s legal status must have survived into the contemporary era because
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The Court’s second case on sex-segregated public education under heightened scrutiny,
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982),48 also left the constitutional status of
“‘separate but equal’” sex-segregated public education unresolved, explicitly reserving judgment
on that question.49  The Hogan Court ordered the School of Nursing in the Mississippi University
for Women to admit men simply on the ground that the men excluded from the school did not
have access elsewhere in Mississippi to the public educational opportunities available to
women.50
Vorchheimer and Hogan appear to reflect the Court’s belief that sex-segregated public
education raises complex constitutional questions.  But the Court was unable in either case to
offer an adequate explanation of the reasoning behind that assessment.
One line of thought visible in the cases drew on a particular vision of the history of sex-
segregated public education, which incorrectly imagined the record of this practice to be wholly
benign, uncontested, structured for the mutual benefit of men and women, and not worth further
investigation.51  This theory featured prominently in the Third Circuit’s opinion in
they embody a set of shared norms, long endorsed by women and men alike.  See Jill Elaine Hasday,
Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1375-85, 1485-90,
1498-1505 (2000); see also id. at 1382-85 (arguing that this presumption also shapes many historical
accounts of the first woman’s rights movement).  For work exploring related assumptions about
women’s consent, see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1770, 1777 (1990) (“In the[] early race discrimination cases,
the courts applied evidentiary standards that presumed that continuing patterns of racial segregation
were attributable to historical labor market discrimination, rather than to minorities’ independent
preferences for lower-paying, less-challenging jobs. . . . [In contrast,] almost half the courts
considering the issue have attributed sex segregation to women’s own work preferences.”); Reva B.
Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning About “the Woman
Question” in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW 131, 133
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999) (“This essay argues that the prevailing understanding
of the suffrage amendment reflects habits of reasoning about gender relations that it in turn helps
sustain.  At the level of common sense, we do not understand gender relations to have a political
history in anything like the way we understand race relations to have a political history: the narrative
structures through which we explain the relations of the sexes depict gender arrangements as the
product of consensus and custom rather than coercion and conflict.  Our understanding of the
Nineteenth Amendment both reflects and sustains these habits of reasoning.”).
52 The Third Circuit in Vorchheimer emphasized that sex-segregated public education was
not rooted in discrimination against women and girls.  “If there are benefits or detriments inherent
in the system,” the court explained, “they fall on both sexes in equal measure.”  Vorchheimer v. Sch.
Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1976).  Although it was unclear where the court’s certainty came
from, it appeared to be based on this sort of picture of the past.
On the Third Circuit’s account, all-male public schools like Central High had established
their exclusionary admissions policies out of innocuous pedagogical motives that were designed to
operate to the shared advantage of boys and girls.  “[T]he special emotional problems of the
adolescent years are matters of human experience and have led some educational experts to opt for
one-sex high schools,” the court recounted.  “While this policy has limited acceptance on its merits,
it does have its basis in a theory of equal benefit and not discriminatory denial.”  Id. at 887; see also
id. at 888 (“[G]iven the objective of a quality education and a controverted, but respected theory that
adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex schools, the policy of the school board here
does bear a substantial relationship.”).  This was more a conclusory statement about the history of
“the time honored educational alternative of sexually-segregated high schools,” id. at 882, than an
actual account of that history.  The Third Circuit, for example, offered no explanation for why
Central High was established exclusively for boys, long before Philadelphia’s girls had any
opportunity to obtain a public high school education, nor did it discuss who had made that judgment.
But the Third Circuit appeared to rely on its vision of history, nonetheless, in holding that
constitutional courts had no responsibility to end women’s exclusion from male public schools, as
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Vorchheimer,52 and was also endorsed by Justice Powell’s dissent in Hogan.  Powell asserted that
long as equivalent public educational opportunities were available elsewhere in the jurisdiction.
53 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 737 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 737 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
practice of voluntarily chosen single-sex education is an honored tradition in our country . . . .
Mississippi’s accommodation of such student choices is legitimate because it is completely
consensual and is important because it permits students to decide for themselves the type of college
education they think will benefit them most.”).
55 Id. at 741 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  Justice Blackmun’s dissent in
Hogan also rejected, without explanation, the analogy between educational segregation based on race
and educational segregation based on sex.  See id. at 734-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I hope that
we do not lose all values that some think are worthwhile (and are not based on differences of race
or religion) and relegate ourselves to needless conformity.”) (emphasis added).
56 Id. at 727.
57 Id. at 727 n.13.
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sex-segregated public education could be constitutional in some contexts because it was not the
product of “any discriminatory animus.”53  He presented no historical evidence to undergird this
conclusion, but drew on some deeper certainty to report that “[t]he sexual segregation of students
has been a reflection of, rather than an imposition upon, the preference of those subject to the
policy.”54  With this consensual view of the history of sex-segregated public education in mind,
moreover, Powell also found it easy to dismiss any comparisons with racially segregated public
education, which he took to have a malevolent and coercive past.  Sex-segregated public
education, Powell explained, had historically operated to expand women’s choices.  It therefore
“differ[ed] from the tradition, typified by the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, of ‘separate but
equal’ racial segregation” because “[i]t was characteristic of racial segregation that segregated
facilities were offered, not as alternatives to increase the choices available to blacks, but as the
sole alternative.”55
The Hogan majority endorsed a different argument.  This line of reasoning stressed that
the history of sex-segregated public education was of no constitutional relevance at all.  It
offered, however, no alternate explanation for the Court’s instinct that sex-segregated public
education could be constitutional.
Mississippi’s “primary justification” in Hogan for excluding men from the School of
Nursing was “that it compensate[d] for discrimination against women.”56  In support of this
contention, Mississippi explained that the Mississippi University for Women had been founded
in 1884 “to provide some form of higher education for the academically disenfranchised,”
because the University of Mississippi banned female students before 1882, and then alternately
prohibited and discouraged the admission of (white) women until after 1920.57  The Hogan Court
accepted this historical account, which suggested that the practice of sex-segregated public
education might be historically entangled in the law’s denial of equal status to women.  But the
Hogan majority simultaneously made clear that it did not matter whether a school’s admissions
policy had been part of the history of women’s legalized inequality, or a response and
58 For more discussion of the founding of the Mississippi University for Women, originally
the Mississippi Industrial Institute and College for the Education of White Girls of the State of
Mississippi in the Arts and Sciences, see infra text accompanying notes 113, 125-127, 168-169.
59 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30 & n.16.
60 Id. at 720 n.1.
61 See id. at 728 (“In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex
can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately
burdened.”).  A similar suggestion appeared in Chief Justice Burger’s dissent.  See id. at 733 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s holding today is limited to the context of a professional nursing
school.  Since the Court’s opinion relies heavily on its finding that women have traditionally
dominated the nursing profession, it suggests that a State might well be justified in maintaining, for
example, the option of an all-women’s business school or liberal arts program.”) (citations omitted).
62 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
63 Id. at 519-20.
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counterweight to it, or both.58  On the Court’s view, Mississippi’s only hope for establishing a
record of discrimination that might affect the constitutionality of the School of Nursing’s
admissions policy would require the state to demonstrate that discrimination currently deprived
women of adequate opportunities to obtain nursing training and to prove that the state intended
for the single-sex admissions policy at the School of Nursing to compensate for that current
practice of discrimination.59
Of course, Hogan’s rejection of the constitutional relevance of history could not
affirmatively account for its impulse to protect certain forms of sex-segregated public education. 
The Hogan Court made space for the possibility of “‘separate but equal’” sex segregation, even
though this was an example of the very sort of explicit sex-based classification that the law of
heightened scrutiny otherwise targeted.60  Indeed, it left room for more than that.  In rejecting
Mississippi’s argument from history, the Hogan Court at least implied that even asymmetrical
sex segregation in public schooling might be constitutionally permissible if it responded to
current (rather than past) inequities, a position that would place the law of sex-segregated public
education in even starker contrast to the constitutional jurisprudence on racially segregated public
schools.61  Yet the Court was never able to explain its intuition that sex segregation in public
education could be constitutional.
B. “Full Citizenship Stature” and “Legal, Social, and Economic Inferiority”
In light of the Court’s persistent uncertainty about the reach and reasoning of heightened
scrutiny, it is worth noting that one of the Court’s newest sex discrimination opinions purports to
offer a more cogent framework.  In United States v. Virginia (1996),62 the Court’s most recent
decision on sex-segregated public education, the United States challenged the constitutionality of
women’s exclusion from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a public college organized “to
produce ‘citizen-soldiers,’ men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service.”63 
64 Id. at 520.
65 See id. at 525-26.
66 See id. at 557 (“VMI, too, offers an educational opportunity no other Virginia institution
provides, and the school’s ‘prestige’—associated with its success in developing ‘citizen-soldiers’—is
unequaled.”).
67 See id. at 520 (“VMI’s endowment reflects the loyalty of its graduates; VMI has the largest
per-student endowment of all public undergraduate institutions in the Nation.”).
68 See id. at 557 (“Virginia has closed this facility to its daughters and, instead, has devised
for them a ‘parallel program,’ with a faculty less impressively credentialed and less well paid, more
limited course offerings, fewer opportunities for military training and for scientific specialization.”).
69 See id.
70 See id. at 520 (“VMI has notably succeeded in its mission to produce leaders; among its
alumni are military generals, Members of Congress, and business executives.  The school’s alumni
overwhelmingly perceive that their VMI training helped them to realize their personal goals.”).
71 See id. (“VMI’s distinctive mission is to produce ‘citizen-soldiers,’ men prepared for
leadership in civilian life and in military service.  VMI pursues this mission through pervasive
training of a kind not available anywhere else in Virginia.”).
72 See id. at 519 (“The United States maintains that the Constitution’s equal protection
guarantee precludes Virginia from reserving exclusively to men the unique educational opportunities
VMI affords.  We agree.”); id. at 534 (“Because the remedy proffered by Virginia—the Mary
Baldwin VWIL program—does not cure the constitutional violation, i.e., it does not provide equal
opportunity, we reverse the Fourth Circuit’s final judgment in this case.”); id. at 557 (“VMI, beyond
question, ‘possesses to a far greater degree’ than the VWIL program ‘those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a . . . school,’ including
‘position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.’  Women
seeking and fit for a VMI-quality education cannot be offered anything less, under the
Commonwealth’s obligation to afford them genuinely equal protection.” (quoting Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950))).
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When this suit was initially filed, no public school in Virginia offered women training as
“‘citizen-soldiers.’”64  But Virginia soon opened a Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership
(VWIL) in an effort to protect VMI’s male-only admissions policy from legal intervention.65  In
many respects, the Supreme Court’s response to this case was very traditional.  The Court easily
determined that Virginia’s sex-segregated educational system, even with VWIL included, did not
satisfy separate but equal standards.  VMI had more prestige than VWIL,66 more resources,67
more course offerings,68 more qualified teachers,69 more influential and loyal alumni,70 and a
unique method of training students,71 and its exclusion of women was unconstitutional for that
reason.72  As the Virginia Court observed, there were women qualified in all but sex to attend
73 See, e.g., id. at 525 (“The parties agreed that ‘some women can meet the physical standards
now imposed on men,’ and the court was satisfied that ‘neither the goal of producing citizen soldiers
nor VMI’s implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to women.’” (quoting 976 F.2d at
896, 899)); id. at 540 (“It is also undisputed . . . that ‘the VMI methodology could be used to educate
women.’  The District Court even allowed that some women may prefer it to the methodology a
women’s college might pursue.” (quoting 852 F. Supp. at 481)); id. at 540-41 (“‘[S]ome women, at
least, would want to attend [VMI] if they had the opportunity,’ the District Court recognized, and
‘some women,’ the expert testimony established, ‘are capable of all of the individual activities
required of VMI cadets.’” (quoting 766 F. Supp. at 1414, 1412)) (alterations in original); id. at 542
(“The issue . . . is not whether ‘women—or men—should be forced to attend VMI’; rather, the
question is whether the Commonwealth can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and
capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords.” (quoting 52 F.3d at
93)); id. at 550 (“[G]eneralizations about ‘the way women are,’ estimates of what is appropriate for
most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them
outside the average description.”).
74 See supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
75 As the Court explained:
We address specifically and only an educational opportunity recognized by the
District Court and the Court of Appeals as “unique,” an opportunity available only
at Virginia’s premier military institute, the Commonwealth’s sole single-sex public
university or college.  Cf. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720,
n. 1 (1982) (“Mississippi maintains no other single-sex public university or college.
Thus, we are not faced with the question of whether States can provide ‘separate but
equal’ undergraduate institutions for males and females.”).
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7 (citations omitted).  Rehnquist’s concurrence, in turn, indicated that
he would uphold the constitutionality of sex-segregated public education where the state operated
a single-sex school for each sex, rather than just one, and “the two institutions offered the same
quality of education and were of the same overall caliber.”  Id. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in judgment).
76 Thus far, the Court’s opinion in Virginia has attracted critical attention mainly for what it
might indicate about the level of constitutional scrutiny appropriately applied to sex-based state
action.  In some passages of the Virginia opinion, the Court explained that explicit legal
classifications based on sex can only survive constitutional challenge if they have “an ‘exceedingly
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VMI,73 and when the school excluded them they did not have access to equivalent public
educational opportunities elsewhere in the state.74  Like Hogan before it, Virginia explicitly
reserved judgment on whether separate but equal sex segregation could be constitutional.75
At the same time, however, the Virginia Court also appeared to suggest a new basis for
determining which forms of sex-based state action represent unconstitutional sex discrimination
and why.76  Most of the Court’s prior sex discrimination cases had assumed that women have no
persuasive justification.’”  Id. at 531; see also id. at 532-34.  A number of scholars have read these
statements to mean that the Court will now apply a more skeptical form of review to sex-based legal
classifications, and this contention has been a central focus of scholarly debate over the opinion.
See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Reading Entrails: Romer, VMI, and the Art of Divining Equal
Protection, 32 TULSA L.J. 361, 369 (1997) (“[Justice Ginsburg writing for the Court in Virginia]
certainly meant to push the Court as far as she could in the direction of strict scrutiny.  I am less
inclined to believe that the rest of the six concurring Justices are fellow travelers in this particular
hermeneutical journey.  But that may not matter—the intermediate courts may take the hint and make
it increasingly impossible for the high court to contain the language of the opinion.”); Deborah L.
Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 35, 36 (1997) (“While the Court
stopped short of explicitly adopting strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications, the opinion includes
a number of indicators suggesting that the standard applied in VMI is essentially as rigorous as
today’s strict scrutiny standard.  Indeed, the analysis the Court applied to strike down VMI’s
exclusion of women is all but indistinguishable from strict scrutiny.”); Jon Gould, The Triumph of
Hate Speech Regulation: Why Gender Wins But Race Loses in America, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
153, 214 (1999) (“In VMI, however, the Court invented a new test for gender classifications that
closely resembles the strict scrutiny test of race.”); Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States
v. Virginia’s New Gender Equal Protection Analysis with Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting,
and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REV. 845, 883 (1997) (“[B]y requiring VMI to make institutional
adjustments to admit qualified women, the Court has elevated equal protection analysis to the level
of the least-restrictive-means analysis of strict scrutiny.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 73 (1996) (“Virginia heightens the level of scrutiny and
brings it closer to the ‘strict scrutiny’ that is applied to discrimination on the basis of race.”); id. at
75 (“[T]he Court did not merely restate the intermediate scrutiny test but pressed it closer to strict
scrutiny.  After United States v. Virginia, it is not simple to describe the appropriate standard of
review.  States must satisfy a standard somewhere between intermediate and strict scrutiny.”).
For the contrary argument, see Case, supra note 37, at 1448 (“This Article will demonstrate
that Justice Scalia is quite right in his articulation of the standard applied by the majority in VMI, but
wrong to assert that it is a departure of any kind from precedent.”).
77 See supra text accompanying note 32.
78 The opinion explains that:
Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities
based on sex responds to volumes of history.  As a plurality of this Court
acknowledged a generation ago, “our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history
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history of constitutional relevance.  Indeed, the brief mention of women’s past that appeared in
the Frontiero plurality opinion—a sketch meant simply to establish a connection between sex
and race—constitutes the most lengthy account of women’s legal history ever included in a
Supreme Court sex discrimination opinion before Virginia.77  Portions of the Virginia opinion,
though, ground the constitutional jurisprudence of sex discrimination in the history of women’s
unequal status under the law.78  More specifically, they suggest that constitutional law has a
of sex discrimination.”  Through a century plus three decades and more of that
history, women did not count among voters composing “We the People”; not until
1920 did women gain a constitutional right to the franchise.  And for a half century
thereafter, it remained the prevailing doctrine that government, both federal and state,
could withhold from women opportunities accorded men so long as any “basis in
reason” could be conceived for the discrimination.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973)).
79 Id. at 532.
80 Id. at 534.
81 Id. at 532-34 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).  Denise Morgan has also noted
this theme in the Virginia opinion, but she contends that it has been consistently expressed in the
Supreme Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence since Frontiero.  See Denise C. Morgan, Anti-
Subordination Analysis After United States v Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12
Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 383 (“Since the Supreme Court decided
Frontiero v Richardson in 1973, constitutional scrutiny of [sex-based] classifications has turned on
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responsibility to work toward the establishment of women’s equal citizenship and the eradication
of women’s legalized inferiority precisely because women’s unequal status is something that the
law itself has long helped to create, maintain, and enforce.
In this vision, the sex discrimination jurisprudence has commitments that are broad and
substantive.  It is intended to give women “full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire,
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and
capacities,”79 by striving to end women’s “legal, social, and economic inferiority.”80  As the
Virginia Court explained:
In 1971, for the first time in our Nation’s history, this Court ruled in favor
of a woman who complained that her State had denied her the equal protection of
its laws.  Since Reed, the Court has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor
state government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law
or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full
citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and
contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities.
. . . .
“Inherent differences” between men and women, we have come to
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of
either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.  Sex
classifications may be used to compensate women “for particular economic
disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promot[e] equal employment opportunity,”
to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people. 
But such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.81
two considerations: ‘fit’ — whether the challenged practice actually serves the objective the
legislature intended it to serve; and ‘anti-subordination’ — whether the legislative objective is to
disadvantage, and sometimes, whether the challenged practice has subordinating effects.”).  In my
view, however, this line of reasoning in Virginia represents much more of a new development.
Virginia suggests that the law’s historical role in maintaining women’s unequal status provides the
normative justification for a doctrine of heightened scrutiny that is grounded in a determination to
protect women’s equal citizenship and combat their inferiority.  In contrast, the Court’s prior sex
discrimination jurisprudence is pointedly indifferent to women’s particular history of legalized
inferiority and, frequently, to substantive issues of equality more generally.  See supra text
accompanying notes 18-20.
82 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7 (quoting Brief for Twenty-six Private Women’s Colleges as
Amici Curiae 5).
83 Id. at 534.
84 Id. at 532.
85 For some examples of the wide range of opinion that presently exists on this subject, see
140 CONG. REC. 26,910 (1994) (statement of Rep. Mink) (“[O]nce you begin segregating students
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Building on this theme, the Virginia Court went on to at least suggest that the
constitutionality of single-sex public schooling might turn, not just on whether the regime
satisfied separate but equal requirements, but on whether the school in question contributed to
women’s unequal status or not.  “Several amici,” the Court reported,
have urged that diversity in educational opportunities is an altogether appropriate
governmental pursuit and that single-sex schools can contribute importantly to
such diversity.  Indeed, it is the mission of some single-sex schools “to dissipate,
rather than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications.”  We do not question the
Commonwealth’s prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational
opportunities.82
This line of reasoning represents a substantially new idea within the constitutional
jurisprudence of sex discrimination, one that the Court seems to believe can offer an effective
way to determine which forms of state action fail heightened scrutiny and a normative
justification for why.  But the Court does not begin to tell us how we might take seriously the
suggestions that Virginia puts forth.  If the constitutional law of sex discrimination is to strike
down those forms of sex-based state action that “create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women,”83 how do we tell which ones they are?  How would we go about
determining what sustains such inferiority and what promotes women’s “full citizenship
stature,”84 in the context of sex-segregated public education or elsewhere?  What would we need
to know to decide the next case, if we were to follow Virginia’s injunction?
The answers to these questions are hardly obvious.  To take the practice most
immediately at hand again, there is certainly room for active debate about whether, when, why,
and how sex-segregated public education contributes to women’s inequality.85  Indeed, even the
by sex, it is the girls that always lose.  It was not too many years ago, when girls continued to be
forced to take home-making while boys took technical training classes which gave them skills they
could easily translate into the marketplace. . . . [T]he path of separate but equal . . . has never proved
to benefit minorities, girls or any other group that has been historically discriminated against in our
schools system.”); Susan Estrich, For Girls’ Schools and Women’s Colleges, Separate Is Better,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 39 (“Instead of declaring equality, society should
be advancing it. . . . One place that happens is in girls’ schools and women’s colleges.  Sometimes
separate isn’t equal; it’s better.  Changing the way teachers teach in coed schools, changing the
textbooks to make sure they talk about women as well as men, educating parents about raising
daughters — all of these things make sense, since most girls will be educated in coed classrooms.
But we’ve been talking about them for a decade, and the problems of gender bias stubbornly
persist.”).
86 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532, 534.
87 For an exception, see KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
AND THE CONSTITUTION 237 (1989) (“Identifying equal citizenship as the substantive core of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not decide concrete cases.  There is as much room for the begging of
questions here as in any other general formulation of principle, and no principle of equality can
escape the problem of open-endedness. . . . ‘It merely states the problem,’ I heard Judge Hand say
on an evening long ago, speaking of his own formulation of another issue.  The equal citizenship
principle merely states the problem of constitutional equality.”).
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large and expanding body of legal literature written in what might be called the “anti-
subordination tradition” does relatively little to help us apply Virginia’s suggested legal standard
to specific situations.  The writers in this tradition would not necessarily agree with the Virginia
Court on all counts.  But the anti-subordination literature, which has argued for more than three
decades that constitutional law enforcing the equal protection guarantee should focus on
eradicating subordination, would still seem to have concerns substantially aligned to those that
the Virginia opinion articulates.  Yet this literature ultimately proves frustrating as a guide to
determining which practices deny women “full citizenship stature” or sustain their “legal, social,
and economic inferiority.”86
The anti-subordination literature has developed a variety of different accounts of how
practices, institutions, and activities can operate to maintain subordination in the United States,
and named a variety of harms that subordination can inflict on the members of targeted classes. 
But although it is generally not remarked upon,87 this literature has been able to tell us much less
about whether a particular practice is subordinating in a particular case and why.
One set of concerns that the anti-subordination literature has identified focuses on what is
typically referred to as social meaning.  Here, the arguments roughly divide into two categories. 
The first explains that practices, institutions, and activities can perpetuate subordination by
creating, expressing, and/or reinforcing a hegemonic or dominant societal contention that the
members of certain groups, like African-Americans or women, are inferior to the members of
88 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 174 (1979) (“Practices which express and reinforce the social
inequality of women to men are clear cases of sex-based discrimination in the inequality approach.”);
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960)
(“[I]t would be the most unneutral of principles, improvised ad hoc, to require that a court faced with
the present problem refuse to note a plain fact about the society of the United States—the fact that
the social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in a position of walled-off
inferiority—or the other equally plain fact that such treatment is hurtful to human beings.”); Charles
R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J.
431, 444 (“Racism is both 100% speech and 100% conduct.  Discriminatory conduct is not racist
unless it also conveys the message of white supremacy—unless it is interpreted within the culture
to advance the structure and ideology of white supremacy.”); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 942-43 (1989) (“[The stigma] approach
focuses less on the concrete effects that a government action has on a group’s position and more on
the message that the action conveys to others. . . . For example, an explicitly race-neutral policy that
had the effect of excluding all blacks from admission to a state university might brand blacks as
inferior by conveying the message that, as a group, they are not as capable as whites.”).
89 See KARST, supra note 86, at 3 (“The principle of equal citizenship, as I use the term,
means this: Each individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society as a
respected, responsible, and participating member.  Stated negatively, the principle forbids the
organized society to treat an individual as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a
nonparticipant.  The principle thus centers on those aspects of equality that are most closely bound
to the sense of self and the sense of inclusion in a community.”); id. at 4 (“Claims to equal
citizenship have always carried an emotional charge in America, especially when inequalities have
attached to such attributes as race, sex, religion, or ethnicity.  These matters touch the heart because
they touch the sense of belonging and therefore the sense of self.  Belonging is a basic human
need. . . . The most heartrending deprivation of all is the inequality of status that excludes people
from full membership in the community, degrading them by labeling them as outsiders, denying
them their very selves.”); id. at 11 (“This book focuses on the hurt of exclusion.  In the perspective
offered here, citizenship means not just rights but responsibility, not just autonomy but belonging.”);
see also Lawrence, supra note 87, at 438-39 (“Brown can also be read more broadly to articulate a
principle central to any substantive understanding of the equal protection clause, the foundation on
which all anti-discrimination law rests.  This is the principle of equal citizenship.  Under that
principle ‘every individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society as a
respected, responsible, and participating member.’  Furthermore, it requires the affirmative
disestablishment of societal practices that treat people as members of an inferior or dependent caste,
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other groups, like whites or men.88  The second, related line of thought, most prominently
associated with Kenneth Karst, maintains that practices, institutions, and activities can similarly
sustain subordination by promoting a hegemonic contention that the members of certain groups
are not part of the national or local community, and in the process can injure the excluded
people’s sense of self and sense of belonging.89
as unworthy to participate in the larger community.” (quoting Karst)).
90 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 87, at 47 (“Women’s feelings about their experiences
of sexual harassment are a significant part of its social impact.  Like women who are raped, sexually
harassed women feel humiliated, degraded, ashamed, embarrassed, and cheap, as well as angry.”);
J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2321 (1997) (“Social status is the
degree of prestige and honor that individuals or groups enjoy.  This prestige involves the approval,
respect, admiration, or positive qualities imputed to a person or group. Lower social status confers
and imputes corresponding disapproval and negative qualities. Although individuals may have
different degrees of status within a single group, they also have status because they are members of
a group.  One can have higher or lower status, for example, because one is an immigrant, a woman,
or a member of ‘the upper crust.’  Critical race scholars have repeatedly noted that white Americans
have certain status privileges conferred on them merely by being white.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2430 (1994) (“A particular concern is that self-respect
and its social bases ought not to be distributed along the lines of race and gender.  When someone
is a member of a group that is systematically subordinate to others, and when the group characteristic
is highly visible, insults to self-respect are likely to occur nearly every day.  An important aspect of
a system of caste is that social practices produce a range of obstacles to the development of
self-respect, largely because of the presence of the highly visible but morally irrelevant characteristic
that gives rise to lower-caste status.”).
91 Although we generally categorize the anti-subordination tradition in different ways, David
Strauss also notes a divide along these lines.  See Strauss, supra note 87, at 941-42 (“There seem to
be two ways of understanding subjugation or subordination.  One focuses on the accumulation of
disadvantages.  A racial group that is worse off than all others in nearly every significant measure
of human welfare might be said to be a ‘subject race.’  The second emphasizes the state of being
personally subject to the will of another.  Slavery was the clearest case of subordination.  Under this
view, the distinctive characteristic of a subordinated group is that its members are systematically
subject to violence at the hands of members of another group, or must systematically yield to the
commands of members of another group.”).
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Linked to this discussion of social meaning, writers in the anti-subordination tradition
have also argued that practices, institutions, and activities can promote subordination by
inflicting dignitary harms on the members of targeted groups.  In this case, concern centers on
practices that treat the members of disfavored classes as unworthy of equal respect and dignity
and instead subject them to humiliation, stigmatization, denigration, and degradation.90
Finally, and most concretely, anti-subordination writers argue that practices, institutions,
and activities can foster subordination by inflicting a wide variety of material harms on the
members of targeted populations.  Speaking generally, these writers have identified two,
connected categories of material harm.91  The first, emphasized by Owen Fiss, Cass Sunstein, and
others, focuses on classic indicators of socioeconomic status and social welfare, explaining that
practices cause subordinating material harm when they systematically leave the members of
targeted groups with less wealth, less political power, less protection from private or public
violence, less education, less health, less life expectancy, less access to housing, and/or less
92 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 150
(1976) (“[Blacks] have two other characteristics as a group that are critical in understanding the
function and reach of the Equal Protection Clause.  One is that blacks are very badly off, probably
our worst-off class (in terms of material well-being second only to the American Indians), and in
addition they have occupied the lowest rung for several centuries.  In a sense, they are America’s
perpetual underclass.”); id. at 151-52 (“It is not just the socioeconomic status of blacks as a group
that explains their special position in equal protection theory.  It is also their political status.  The
power of blacks in the political arena is severely limited.”); Sunstein, supra note 89, at 2429 (“The
motivating idea behind an anticaste principle is that without good reason, social and legal structures
should not turn differences that are both highly visible and irrelevant from the moral point of view
into systematic social disadvantages.  A systematic disadvantage is one that operates along standard
and predictable lines in multiple and important spheres of life and that applies in realms that relate
to basic participation as a citizen in a democracy.  There is no algorithm by which to identify those
realms.  As a provisional working list, we might include education, freedom from private and public
violence, income and wealth, political representation, longevity, health, and political influence.”);
see also Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986) (“In this Article, I argue that courts should analyze equal protection cases
from an anti-subordination perspective.  Under the anti-subordination perspective, it is inappropriate
for certain groups in society to have subordinated status because of their lack of power in society as
a whole.  This approach seeks to eliminate the power disparities between men and women, and
between whites and non-whites, through the development of laws and policies that directly redress
those disparities.”); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1377 (1988)
(“Material subordination . . . refers to the ways that discrimination and exclusion economically
subordinated Blacks to whites and subordinated the life chances of Blacks to those of whites on
almost every level.  This subordination occurs when Blacks are paid less for the same work, when
segregation limits access to decent housing, and where poverty, anxiety, poor health care, and crime
create a life expectancy for Blacks that is five to six years shorter than for whites.”).
93 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 87, at 216 (“Sexual harassment at work critically
undercuts women’s potential for work equality as a means to social equality.  Beyond survival,
employment outside the home may offer women some promise of developing a range of capacities
for which the nurturing, cleaning, and servant role of housework and child care provide little outlet.
A job, no matter how menial, offers the potential for independence from the nuclear family, which
makes women dependent upon men for life necessities.”); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with
Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 760 (1997) (“The anti-subordination principle could
be greatly improved by conceptualizing the problem as one of gender subordination defined in
hetero-patriarchal terms.  Thus, sexual harassment is understood as a mechanism by which an
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leisure.92  The second focuses on control and autonomy, explaining that practices cause
subordinating material harm when they systematically leave the members of targeted groups with
less control or power over their own lives and more subject to the control and direction of
another person or the state.93
orthodoxy regarding masculinity and femininity is enforced, policed, and perpetuated in the
workplace.”); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 351 (1992) (“From a historical
perspective it is clear that abortion-restrictive regulation is caste legislation, a traditional mode of
regulating women’s conduct, concerned with compelling them to perform the work that has
traditionally defined their subordinate social role and status.”).
94 The labor, controversy, and judgment involved in translating anti-subordination theory into
a specific agenda for legal reform is one reason that the relatively small body of scholarship applying
anti-subordination principles to particular practices has made some of the most persuasive
contributions to the anti-subordination tradition.  This body of work includes Richard Delgado,
Charles Lawrence, and Mari Matsuda on hate speech, Catharine MacKinnon on sexual harassment,
and Reva Siegel on abortion regulation.  See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 89, 94 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993);
Lawrence, supra note 87, at 461-62, 464-65; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2336-39 (1989); MACKINNON, supra note
87, at 7, 9-10, 27, 51; Siegel, supra note 92, at 370.  This work tends not to self-consciously reflect
on the fact of its particularity.  In other words, it tends not to explicitly analyze the fact that it is
applying anti-subordination principles to a particular practice, and that those principles might apply
differently in other contexts.  But this body of scholarship does attempt to confront the questions and
gather the evidence involved in making the case for why, when, and how hate speech, sexual
harassment, abortion regulation, or some other specific practice causes specific and identified
subordinating injuries to specific and identified classes of people.
95 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532, 534 (1996).
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Taken together, this body of work provides some important guidance and criteria.  For
example, this literature explains that practices can cause subordination by inflicting dignitary or
material injury on individuals in targeted classes.  This is definitely helpful information.  Yet at
the same time, it does not reveal whether any particular practice operates in that way or causes
those kinds of subordinating harms, nor does it indicate how we are to ascertain the answers to
these questions.94
So, to return again to Virginia, how would we go about applying the standard that opinion
suggests?  How can we determine whether a particular practice denies women “full citizenship
stature” or “create[s] or perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women”?95  In
the remainder of this Article, I propose to try to give some content to the framework that Virginia
outlines.  More specifically, Part II will explore the potential usefulness of the historical record.
History is not the sole source that one could draw upon in considering how to flesh out
Virginia’s proposed standard.  It is also not the case that a historical record can decisively
indicate whether a particular practice currently operates to deny women equal citizenship and
maintain their inferiority.  Over time, practices can be reborn in important ways to serve new
functions, accomplish new purposes, and play new roles.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 532.
98 Id. at 532, 534.
99 Walter Herbert Small’s thorough survey of colonial New England found only a small
handful of references indicating that girls were educated in town schools, alongside boys or
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But a historical record can usefully inform an inquiry into whether a particular practice
deprives women of equal citizenship.  Considering a practice at some distance from the present
day can uncover and highlight issues that may be hidden or submerged in current discussions.  It
can illuminate areas of concern, suggest factors that might be relevant, and reveal ways in which
a Court applying the Virginia framework should be paying attention.  It can help us identify some
of the questions that a reasonable decisionmaker implementing Virginia’s standard should be
asking in deciding whether a specific practice contributes to women’s inequality.
With this in mind, Part II turns to a historical record to wrestle with what we would need
to know in order to determine whether a practice deprives women of “full citizenship stature” or
operates “to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”96  Since
this project is importantly motivated by the Virginia case, it takes as its case study the practice
(or set of practices) that is sex-segregated public education in the United States.
II. SEX-SEGREGATED PUBLIC EDUCATION: A CASE STUDY IN USING HISTORY TO INFORM AN
INQUIRY INTO WHETHER A SPECIFIC PRACTICE DENIES WOMEN “FULL CITIZENSHIP
STATURE” OR MAINTAINS THEIR “LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC INFERIORITY”
The historical record of sex-segregated public education brings into focus a variety of
factors, issues, and questions that a Court could usefully consider in determining the appropriate
constitutional status of sex-segregated public education under Virginia’s framework.  In the
process, this record also suggests that Virginia’s “full citizenship” standard may ultimately
challenge, unsettle, and undermine many of the foundational assumptions of the current sex
discrimination jurisprudence, including some endorsed in Virginia itself.97
It is worth emphasizing again that this is not because the historical record decisively
establishes how sex-segregated public education, or any other practice, presently operates or
should currently be regulated.  Indeed, one insight that the historical record of sex-segregated
public education brings to light is that whether, when, why, and how a specific practice denies
women “full citizenship stature” or “create[s] or perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women” can change over time.98  This possibility is not acknowledged in the
Virginia opinion, which seems to envision the practices that maintain women’s unequal status as
more fixed and stable.  But even a brief review of the historical record of sex-segregated public
education demonstrates that a practice’s role in promoting unequal citizenship and legalized
inferiority can evolve and shift.
Initially, for instance, public jurisdictions used sex segregation to completely deny
women and girls access to various levels of public education.  The exclusion of female students
from public primary schools was a common practice in colonial New England,99 and continued in
separately.  Based on all the available evidence, he concluded that “girls were generally barred out.”
WALTER HERBERT SMALL, EARLY NEW ENGLAND SCHOOLS 275-77 (1914).
Farmington, Connecticut, for instance, voted in 1687 to allocate twenty pounds “‘for the
maintenance of a school for the year ensuing, for the instruction of all such children as shall be sent
to it, to learn to read and write the English tongue.’”  Id. at 277.  Some Farmington residents
apparently objected to the linguistic imprecision, however, perhaps because some girls attempted to
attend the town school.  The town clarified its initial decision the next year, with a vote “‘declar[ing]
that all such is to be understood [as meaning] only male children that are through their horn book.’”
Id.
100 Northampton, Massachusetts, for example, excluded all female students from its public
schools, a situation recorded in a rare lawsuit brought against the town in 1792.  See The Early
Schools, in CENTENNIAL HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE 12, 12 (Northampton, Hampshire Gazette 1886).  As
the Centennial edition of the Northampton Gazette would later recall, “the town was indicted and
fined” for its refusal to admit girls to its public schools.  Id.  The legal basis for this court victory
(like the identity of the plaintiffs) is unclear, as the court records for the judicial challenge apparently
no longer exist.  Whatever the grounds for the decision, though, the Gazette recounted that
Northampton responded to the judicial judgment against the town in 1792 by voting, “‘by a large
majority,’ to admit girls between the ages of 8 and 15 to the schools from May 1 to Oct. 31.”  Id.;
see also 2 JAMES RUSSELL TRUMBULL, HISTORY OF NORTHAMPTON MASSACHUSETTS, FROM ITS
SETTLEMENT IN 1654, at 551-52 (1902) (quoting the report of the 1792 Northampton committee that
recommended the establishment of some coeducational public schools).  It is worth noting, however,
that Northampton does not appear to have consistently abided by the legal judgment against it.
According to the town’s history, “[g]irls were not admitted to the town schools every year after
permission was first granted.  In 1799, the town refused to make any appropriation for schooling
them.”  Id. at 585.
101 See, e.g., EMIT DUNCAN GRIZZELL, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGH SCHOOL IN
NEW ENGLAND BEFORE 1865, at 277 (1922); ALEXANDER JAMES INGLIS, THE RISE OF THE HIGH
SCHOOL IN MASSACHUSETTS 15 (1911).
102 See INGLIS, supra note 100, at 16; SEMI-CENTENNIAL ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENGLISH
HIGH SCHOOL 76-78 (Boston, Nathan Sawyer & Son 1871).
103 See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1975); supra text
accompanying notes 40-43.
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the nation’s first years.100  In the first part of the nineteenth century, in turn, the jurisdictions at
the forefront of public education systematically barred women from the new forms of secondary
education that were becoming available to men.  Boston, for example, established what most
scholars consider to be the first public high school in the United States in 1821.101  But it was
only open to male students.102  The Central High School in Philadelphia, which became the
nation’s first public high school outside of Boston in 1836 and the future subject of the
Vorchheimer case, similarly excluded women.103
Starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, though, the practice of sex-segregated
public education changed in important ways.  As the rise of the industrial era made literacy more
104 This school had opened in 1852 as a small two-year normal school for the training of
grammar school teachers.  See OLIVE B. WHITE, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE GIRLS’ HIGH SCHOOL
OF BOSTON 9, 14-16 (1952); LUCY R. WOODS, A HISTORY OF THE GIRLS’ HIGH SCHOOL OF BOSTON,
1852-1902, at 6 (1904); Girls in the Public Schools of Boston, 13 AM. J. EDUC. 243, 263-66 (1863).
By 1853, however, women had secured twenty-seven hundred signatures on a petition demanding
a High School for Girls in Boston.  See HARRIOT K. HUNT, GLANCES AND GLIMPSES 309 (Boston,
John P. Jewett & Co. 1856).
Boston had actually established an earlier High School for Girls in 1826.  See Girls in the
Public Schools of Boston, supra, at 246 (quoting the first catalogue of the High School for Girls).
But the city closed this women’s high school after only two years, citing specifically the tremendous
demand for it.  See id. at 247.  As the Boston School Committee explained, young men attended
Boston’s English High School in order to prepare for “‘professions and pursuits,’” so rigorous
meritocractic selection was called for in order to identify the most promising male scholars.  Id. at
250 (quoting report adopted at February 21, 1828 meeting of Boston School Committee).  In
contrast, the School Committee insisted that young women would have no professional use for their
educations once they married, and concluded that singling out the most academically promising
women would therefore be inconsistent with the purpose of the High School for Girls.  See id.
(quoting report adopted at February 21, 1828 meeting of Boston School Committee).
105 See Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 328; ROBERT WAYNE CLARK, THE GENESIS OF THE
PHILADELPHIA HIGH SCHOOL FOR GIRLS 13, 25, 36, 90-92 (1938).  For articles advocating the
creation of a High School for Girls in Philadelphia, see Free Academy for Girls, 50 GODEY’S LADY’S
BOOK 468, 468 (1855) (“When is the ‘High School for Girls’ to be established in Philadelphia?”);
High Schools for Girls, 46 GODEY’S LADY’S BOOK 176, 176 (1853) (“Philadelphia has one of the
most flourishing High Schools for Boys in the United States. . . . Where is its twin seminary for the
daughters of the people?  Are these, the jewels of the State, the grace and glory of their homes, to
be forgotten, and left in comparative ignorance, when the character, the destiny of the coming
generation are to be in their keeping?”); Philadelphia High School for Girls, 48 GODEY’S LADY’S
BOOK 464, 464 (1854) (“When is this institution to be opened?  The High School for Boys has been
sustained in the most liberal manner many years, and now a new and costly edifice for the school is
nearly prepared.  Will not the men of Philadelphia add beauty as well as strength to the recent act
of ‘Consolidation,’ by founding a HIGH SCHOOL FOR GIRLS?”).
106 Baltimore established a high school exclusively for white boys in 1839, and founded two
high schools for white girls in 1844.  See Baltimore Public Schools, 13 COMMON SCH. J. 102, 103
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important, more Americans came to believe that women’s role required schooling consistent with
their racial and economic status.  A variety of jurisdictions in this period used sex-segregated
education to expand women’s inclusion and engagement in the public educational system.  In the
second half of the nineteenth century, for instance, a number of cities that had first opened
secondary schools exclusively for men also created high schools for female students.  Boston
established a public high school for women in 1854,104 and Philadelphia opened a normal school
for women in 1848 that became an academic high school in 1893.105  This movement, however,
mostly included southern jurisdictions, such as Baltimore,106 Charleston,107 Louisville,108 and
(1851); A.D. Mayo, The Organization and Development of the American Common School in the
Atlantic and Central States of the South, 1830 to 1860, in 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
EDUCATION FOR THE YEAR 1899-1900, at 427, 443 (1901).  Before “1867 there was no provision for
the public schooling of colored children.”  Id.
107 Charleston established a high school for white boys in 1839.  See William M. Geer, The
High School of Charleston: Ninety-eight Years of Service, 1 S. ASS’N Q. 385, 385-86 (1937).  But
it did not create a high school for white girls until 1858.  See MARY TAYLOR, A HISTORY OF THE
MEMMINGER NORMAL SCHOOL CHARLESTON, S.C. 1, 4, 7-8 (1941).
108 White men in Louisville, Kentucky had long had access to a “school known at different
periods in its history as Jefferson Seminary, Louisville College, and the academic department of the
University of Louisville.”  ALVIN FAYETTE LEWIS, HISTORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN KENTUCKY
348 (U.S. Bureau of Education, Circular of Information No. 3, Washington, Government Printing
Office 1899).  The city formally converted this school into a white male high school in 1851, the
same year the city provided by charter for a white female high school.  See id. at 348-49.  The school
for white female students, however, did not actually open until 1856.  See id. at 349; see also
REPORT OF THE GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL OF LOUISVILLE, KY. 2 (1916).  Louisville also opened a Manual
Training High School, exclusively for white male students, in 1892.  See SIXTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE MANUAL TRAINING HIGH SCHOOL 9-10 (1908).
109 New Orleans opened a high school for white boys in 1845, and a high school for white
girls in 1847.  See Elsa Louise Behrend, The New Orleans Public School System Since the Civil War
4-5 (1931) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Tulane University) (on file with author).
110 See An Act To create and establish an industrial school in the State of Alabama for white
girls, § 6, 1893 Ala. Acts 1002, 1004 (providing for “[t]he establishment and maintenance of a first-
class industrial school for the education of white girls in the State of Alabama in industrial and
scientific branches, at which said girls may acquire a thorough normal school education, together
with a knowledge of kindergarten instruction and music; also a knowledge of telegraphy, type-
writing, stenography, photography and phonography”).
111 See An Act Providing for Securing the Site, Erecting, Equipping and Furnishing Buildings
for a Women’s College Affiliated with Delaware College, at Newark, Delaware, and to Provide the
Method of Paying for the Same, ch. 124, § 1, 27 Del. Laws 311, 311 (1913) (providing for “a
Women’s College affiliated with Delaware College, at Newark, Delaware”).
112 See An Act to abolish the Florida Agricultural College, ch. 5384, §§ 12, 22, 1905 Fla.
Laws ch. 13, 37, 45, 53 (establishing “The Florida Female College,” for “[n]one but female white
students,” “to teach and instruct in all the higher branches of education, and in all the useful arts and
sciences that may be necessary or appropriate to be taught in like institutions”).
113 See An Act to establish a Normal and Industrial College as a branch of the State
University, for the education of white girls; to appropriate money for the same, and for other
purposes, §§ 1, 10, 1889 Ga. Laws 10, 10, 13 (establishing “a college for the education of white
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New Orleans.109  Similarly, a spate of mostly southern states (including Alabama,110 Delaware,111
Florida,112 Georgia,113 Mississippi,114 New Jersey,115 North Carolina,116 Oklahoma,117 South
girls, to be known as the ‘Georgia Normal and Industrial College’” to teach such “practical industries
as may tend to fit and prepare girls for occupations which are consistent with feminine refinement
and modesty”).
114 See An Act to create and establish an Industrial Institute in the State of Mississippi, and
a College for the education of white girls in the arts and sciences, ch. 30, §§ 1, 6, 1884 Miss. Laws
50, 50, 52 (establishing “the Mississippi Industrial Institute and College for the Education of White
Girls of the State of Mississippi in the Arts and Sciences,” to provide “a thorough normal school
education, together with a knowledge of kindergarten instruction, also a knowledge of telegraphy,
stenography and photography; also a knowledge of drawing, painting, designing, and engraving in
their industrial application; also a knowledge of fancy, practical and general needle-work; and, also,
a knowledge of bookkeeping”).
115 On the founding of the New Jersey College for Women in 1918, see THE EARLY HISTORY
OF NEW JERSEY COLLEGE FOR WOMEN: PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS BY DEAN DOUGLASS 5-14
(1928); Rutgers College, Meeting of the Trustees of Rutgers College in New Jersey 4 (Apr. 12, 1918)
(on file with author; Rutgers University Libraries) (“Resolved that the Trustees of Rutgers College
do establish a Woman’s College as a department of the State University of New Jersey maintained
by the Trustees.”).
116 See An act to establish a normal and industrial school for white girls, ch. 139, §§ 1, 5,
1891 N.C. Sess. Laws 126, 126-27 (establishing “an institution for the white race under the corporate
name of ‘The Normal and Industrial School’” “to give to young women such education as shall fit
them for teaching” and “to give instruction to young women in drawing, telegraphy, type-writing,
stenography, and such other industrial arts as may be suitable to their sex and conducive to their
support and usefulness”).
117 See An Act To Establish An Industrial Institute And College For Girls In The State Of
Oklahoma, And Providing For Its Location And Government, §§ 2-3, 13, 1908 Okla. Sess. Laws
614, 614-16 (establishing “the ‘Oklahoma Industrial Institute and College for Girls,’” open to “[a]ll
white female citizens of Oklahoma between the ages of twelve (12) and thirty-five (35),” “to give
instruction in industrial arts, the English language and the various branches of mathematical,
physical, natural and economical sciences, with special reference to their application in the industries
of life”).
118 See An Act to Establish a Normal and Industrial College in the State of South Carolina
for the Education of White Girls, §§ 1, 5, 1891 S.C. Acts 1102, 1102, 1104 (establishing “‘The
South Carolina Industrial and Winthrop Normal College’” “for the thorough education of the ‘white
girls’ of South Carolina, the main objects of which shall be (1) to give to young women such
education as shall fit them for teaching; (2) to give instruction to young women in . . . such other
industrial arts as may be suitable to their sex and conducive to their support and usefulness”).
119 See An Act to create and establish an industrial institute and college in the State of Texas
for the education of white girls in the arts and sciences, ch. 132, §§ 1, 5, 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws 306,
306-07 (establishing “the ‘Texas Industrial Institute and College for the Education of White Girls
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Carolina,118 and Texas)119 established public women’s colleges in the late nineteenth and early
of the State of Texas in the Arts and Sciences,’” “at which such girls may acquire a literary
education, together with a knowledge of kindergarten instruction; also a knowledge of telegraphy,
stenography and photography; also a knowledge of drawing, painting, designing and engraving, in
their industrial application; also a knowledge of general needle-work, including dressmaking; also
a knowledge of bookkeeping; also a thorough knowledge of scientific and practical cooking,
including a chemical study of food; also a knowledge of practical housekeeping”).
120 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
121 Id. at 532, 534.
122 See id. at 546 n.16 (“VMI has successfully managed another notable change.  The school
admitted its first African-American cadets in 1968.”); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 719-20 (1982) (“In 1884, the Mississippi Legislature created the Mississippi Industrial
Institute and College for the Education of White Girls of the State of Mississippi, now the oldest
state-supported all-female college in the United States.”); id. at 727 n.13 (“Apparently, the impetus
for founding MUW came not from a desire to provide women with advantages superior to those
offered men, but rather from a desire to provide white women in Mississippi access to
state-supported higher learning.  In 1856, Sally Reneau began agitating for a college for white
women.”).
On the Mississippi University for Women’s resistance to racial desegregation, see United
States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 722 (1992) (“Despite this Court’s decisions in Brown I and Brown
II, Mississippi’s policy of de jure segregation continued.  The first black student was not admitted
to the University of Mississippi until 1962, and then only by court order.  For the next 12 years the
segregated public university system in the State remained largely intact.  Mississippi State
University, Mississippi University for Women, University of Southern Mississippi, and Delta State
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twentieth centuries.  If one were to evaluate whether, when, why, and how sex-segregated public
education operated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to deny women “full
citizenship stature,”120 the conclusions one would draw would have to differ, in at least some
respects, from the assessments that one would make about the practice of sex-segregated public
education as it existed a half century earlier.
Nevertheless, the historical record of sex-segregated public education can usefully inform
an investigation into whether, when, why, and how sex-segregated public education currently
functions to deprive women of “full citizenship” or maintain their “inferiority.”121  Let’s examine
that record to see how this can work.
A. Different Populations of Women Are Not Necessarily Interchangeable in
Considering What Denies Women “Full Citizenship” and Maintains Their
“Inferiority”
Virginia, following the Court’s earlier sex discrimination cases, appears to assume that
different populations of women are interchangeable for constitutional purposes.  The Virginia
opinion, like the one in Hogan before it, notes that the school it is reviewing was once racially
segregated.122  But neither Virginia nor Hogan ever explores or mentions the possibility that a
University each admitted at least one black student during these years, but the student composition
of these institutions was still almost completely white.”) (citation omitted).
123 To take a very prominent example, M. Elizabeth Tidball’s famous study of 1500 women
listed in Who’s Who of American Women compared the graduates of coeducational colleges and
women’s colleges from 1910 to 1960.  See M. Elizabeth Tidball, Perspective on Academic Women
and Affirmative Action, 54 EDUC. REC. 130, 132 (1973).  It found that the women’s colleges
produced approximately “two-fold” more women “achievers” per thousand women graduates per
decade than the coeducational colleges.  See id.  Based on this data, Tidball concluded that “men
students and women faculty emerge as primary determinants of the number of women achievers.
The fact that the women’s colleges have none of the former and more of the latter than coeducational
institutions may largely explain their significantly greater contribution to the wider society of career-
successful women during the past 50 years.”  Id. at 134.  Tidball’s study, however, did not control
for either the class or the race of the female graduates.
Later work by Mary J. Oates and Susan Williamson found no difference between the
achievement levels of women who graduated from small women’s colleges in the 1930s and women
who graduated from small coeducational colleges in that decade, once one removed the women who
graduated from the most elite, and wealthy, private women’s colleges of the era, the “Seven Sisters”
colleges.  See Mary J. Oates & Susan Williamson, Women’s Colleges and Women Achievers, 3
SIGNS 795, 799-800 (1978) (“The [Seven Sisters] produced achievers at the rate of sixty-one per
10,000 graduates during the decade of the 1930s.  In sharp contrast, the small [non-Seven Sisters
women’s colleges] and small [coeducational colleges] each produced at a rate of eighteen achievers
per 10,000 women graduates.  The [Seven Sisters] rate was 3.4 times that of all other small colleges
and four times that of all other institutions, regardless of size.  With the exception of the 1940s, at
no time do they account for fewer than half of women’s-college achievers.”).  Oates and Williamson
concluded that “[i]t is not sufficient to observe that [the Seven Sisters] colleges were more selective
in admissions than the other women’s colleges.  Rather, it is our contention that the average
socioeconomic level of the student body in these seven colleges may be even more critical in
accounting for the differences, although selectivity does remain a factor.”  Id. at 803.
124 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
125 Id. at 534.
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sex-segregated public school might inflict somewhat different injuries on white and African-
American women, or that the practice of sex-segregated public education might be partially
motivated or structured by concerns tied to race and class.  In this regard, the opinions track
much of the scholarly literature on sex-segregated public education, which has frequently
overlooked or underemphasized the ways in which race and class have shaped sex-segregated
public education in the United States.123
The historical record of sex-segregated public education reveals, however, that practices
can deny “full citizenship stature,”124 and “create or perpetuate . . . legal, social, and economic
inferiority,”125 for one group of women and not another, or can maintain the unequal status of
different sets of women in different ways.  In the case of public education, for example, race and
126 Through the middle of the twentieth century, for instance, Texas A&M limited admission
to students who were both white and male.  See TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. VII, § 7 (“Separate
schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, and impartial provision shall be made
for both.”); Davis Holds Texas A.&M. Is Boys School, BRYAN DAILY EAGLE, Jan. 5, 1934, at 1, 4
(reporting opinion from the district court of Brazos County, Texas that upheld the exclusion of
women from Texas A&M); Texas Girls Are Denied Right To Enroll in A. & M. College As Writ Is
Refused By Court, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 6, 1934, at 1, 2 (reporting same decision).  Similarly,
Virginia maintained four public colleges by the end of the nineteenth century, all limited to white
men: the University of Virginia, the Virginia Military Institute, the Virginia Polytechnic Institute,
and William and Mary College.  See The Co-Ordinate College—A Vital Matter, 10 VA. J. EDUC.
410, 410 (1917).  For more examples of white-only admissions policies in both men’s and women’s
public schools, see supra notes 105-109, 111-113, 115-118, 121.
127 See An Act to create and establish an Industrial Institute in the State of Mississippi, and
a College for the education of white girls in the arts and sciences, ch. 30, § 1, 1884 Miss. Laws 50,
50; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 719-20; EDWARD MAYES, HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN MISSISSIPPI 245-55
(U.S. Bureau of Education, Circular of Information No. 2, Washington, Government Printing Office
1899); supra text accompanying notes 47-49, 52-60.
128 An Act to create and establish an Industrial Institute in the State of Mississippi, and a
College for the education of white girls in the arts and sciences § 6; see also statutes cited supra
notes 109-118.
129 For example, the only public institution of higher learning open to African-American
students in Texas before 1947 was coeducational.  See An Act to establish an Agricultural and
Mechanical College of Texas, for the benefit of the colored youths and to make appropriations
therefor, ch. 92, § 1, 1876 Tex. Gen. Laws 136, 136 (establishing “an Agricultural and Mechanical
College for the benefit of the colored youths of this State”).  The Texas State University for Negroes,
founded in 1947, also admitted both men and women.  See An Act providing for the establishment,
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sex segregation, as well as class stratification, have long been practically and symbolically
intertwined, although the precise nature of the interactions has shifted over time.
Public school systems in the United States have not made uniform efforts to segregate the
sexes.  Until the Brown decision and its enforcement, sex-segregated public schools were also
frequently racially segregated, especially in the South where sex-segregated public education was
particularly concentrated.  More specifically, many sex-segregated public schools were explicitly
limited to whites,126 and only slightly less explicitly restricted to students from relatively
privileged socioeconomic backgrounds.  The Mississippi Industrial Institute and College, for
example, was founded in 1884 to serve white women exclusively, and white ladies more
precisely.  The school, which would eventually become the subject of the Hogan decision,127
trained its students to be teachers and secretaries.  But it also imparted skills, like “drawing,
painting, designing, and engraving,” that were sought in a specific class of comparatively affluent
women.128  In contrast, the same southern states that most strongly supported the sex-based
segregation of white students in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries almost always operated
coeducational schools for African-Americans.129  Through this structure, sex-segregated public
support, maintenance and direction of a University of the first class for the instruction and training
of colored people of this state, to be known as “The Texas State University for Negroes,” ch. 29, §
12, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws 36, 40 (“The term ‘qualified applicant’ as used in this Act shall mean any
colored person who meets the educational requirements for entrance to the same course or courses
in the University of Texas or any of its branches.  The term ‘colored person’ has the same meaning
as contained in the provisions of the Texas Constitution requiring separate schools, . . . to-wit: a
negro or person of African descent.”).
Similarly, the only form of public higher education open to blacks in Virginia through the
first half of the twentieth century was a coeducational school, first called the Virginia Normal and
Collegiate Institute and eventually renamed the Virginia State College for Negroes.  See STATE
BOARD OF EDUCATION, VIRGINIA COLLEGES: A BULLETIN OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE STATE
COLLEGES AND THE COLLEGES UNDER PRIVATE CONTROL IN VIRGINIA 19 (1942).  Louisville,
Kentucky, in turn, operated sex-segregated high schools for its white students in the early twentieth
century, but a coeducational high school for African-Americans.  See Reports of the Louisville
School Board for the Years 1901-1902 and 1902-1903, in CITY OF LOUISVILLE: ANNUAL REPORTS
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING AUGUST 31, 1903, AND DECEMBER 31, 1903, at 240, 247 (1905);
supra note 107; infra notes 156, 164-166 and accompanying text.
Alcorn University, Mississippi’s first public college for African-Americans, was limited to
male students upon its founding in 1871, but became coeducational in 1895.  See W. MILAN DAVIS,
PUSHING FORWARD: A HISTORY OF ALCORN A. & M. COLLEGE AND PORTRAITS OF SOME OF ITS
SUCCESSFUL GRADUATES 10-11, 27-29 (1938).  In his 1895 report to the Alcorn trustees, which
advocated establishing coeducation, President Thomas J. Calloway explained that he “‘had visited
all the leading schools for colored people in Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Tennessee, Kentucky and Mississippi, and [was] familiar with the workings of those in Louisiana,
Texas, Arkansas and Missouri.  Alcorn College [was] the only one, strictly speaking, that [was] for
boys only.’”  Id. at 25, 27; see also infra text accompanying notes 134-135.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
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education became a means of recognizing and developing the race and class status of relatively
privileged whites, while simultaneously emphasizing the degraded racial and economic status of
African-Americans.
One thing this record helps us understand is why someone like Justice Powell might
assume that the historical practice of sex-segregated public education has been benign and geared
to the mutual benefit of both sexes.130  This vision is not an accurate description of the past.  But
the social power of this understanding of history probably reflects the fact that the practice of
sex-segregated public education was a form of privilege for some women in some respects.
Stated more concretely, it seems clear that white women, especially elite white women,
received various dignitary benefits from the practice of sex-segregated public education. 
Treatment as a lady implied a certain level of dignity.  Like the notion that the home is the
particular province of women, it was historically associated with a judgment that the women
designated as ladies were to be accorded some respect in arenas considered domestic, such as
131 Writing about a somewhat earlier era, Nancy Cott has nicely drawn out some of the ways
in which what she calls “[t]he doctrine of woman’s sphere opened to women (reserved for them) the
avenues of domestic influence, religious morality, and child nurture.”  NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS
OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 200 (2d ed. 1997).
132 For an excellent account of black women’s efforts in the second half of the nineteenth
century and the beginning of the twentieth to win admission to the cars that railroads reserved for
“ladies,” see Barbara Y. Welke, When All the Women Were White, and All the Blacks Were Men:
Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855-1914, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 261, 276 (1995)
(“Regulations barring people of color from ladies’ accommodations and assigning women and men
of color alike to smoking cars reflected the assumption ‘that all the women were white, and all the
blacks were men.’  This assumption denied people of color the right so fundamental to defining class
status in nineteenth-century America, that is, the right of women of color to be recognized as ladies.
In marked contrast to the accepted rule for first-class white travel, there was no attempt to provide
women of color traveling first-class separate, superior facilities.”).
133 See infra text accompanying notes 183-192.
134 See infra text accompanying notes 168-169.
135 See An Act to establish and maintain Alcorn University of Mississippi, and for other
purposes, ch. 327, § 4, 1871 Miss. Laws 716, 717; DAVIS, supra note 128, at 10-11; supra note 128.
136 See An Act to establish and organize Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges, and to
regulate the government of the same, ch. 19, § 1, 1878 Miss. Laws 118, 119 (“Be it enacted by the
Legislature of the State of Mississippi, That the institution known as the Alcorn University, is hereby
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courtship, home life, and child rearing.131  This is not to say that the practice of sex-segregated
public education caused white women to suffer no dignitary harm.  We can note at the outset that
the respect associated with ladyhood was quite different from, and not necessarily equivalent to,
the respect granted to white men.  But sex-segregated public education was nevertheless
something of a mixed practice for white women.  In contrast, sex-segregated public education
inflicted unambiguous and particularly harsh dignitary harms on African-American women. 
Unlike white women, they were subject to the authoritatively enforced contention that they did
not need or deserve to be treated like ladies, that because of their race they were not entitled to
even the modicum of respect otherwise associated with their sex.132
Similarly, if one considers the practice of sex-segregated public education from the
standpoint of material injury, women’s public schools gave many of their students more access to
public education than they had had before.  Here too, moreover, the material harm that women
suffered as a result of their exclusion from the public schools reserved for white men differed
dramatically for white and black women, even if neither group had access to the educational
institutions where, as we will see,133 the social capital most associated with economic and
political success was distributed.  Consider Mississippi’s system of higher education again.  The
Mississippi Industrial Institute and College, discussed more below,134 trained white women to be
ladies.  Alcorn University of Mississippi, founded in 1871 as the state’s first public college open
to African-Americans,135 trained its students to be farmers.136
established as, and declared to be, an agricultural college for the education of the colored youth of
the State, and to be hereafter known as the Alcorn Agricultural and Mechanical College of the State
of Mississippi.”).
137 See United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., No. 3983, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Miss. July 14,
1970) (findings of fact and recommendations), ruling deferred, Nos. 28030 & 28042, slip op. at 2
(5th Cir. Aug. 6, 1970) (per curiam) (permitting sex segregation to continue); Moore v. Tangipahoa
Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed at request of all parties,
421 F.2d 1407, 1407 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 302 F.
Supp. 106, 108 (E.D. La. 1969), amended on other grounds, 316 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. La. 1970);
Banks v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., No. 16173, slip op. at 1-3 (E.D. La. June 9, 1969).
138 On the central role that white America’s concerns about preventing sexual contact between
white women and black men played in promoting racial segregation in the United States, see, for
example, MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
SOUTH 1-6 (1997); LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY
265 (1979) (“Behind every discussion and skirmish involving racial separation lurked the specter
of unrestrained black lust and sexuality, with that most feared of consequences—racial
amalgamation or, as it was now popularly called, miscegenation.”); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism
and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1343-53, 1365-70 (1998).
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Once Brown was decided and enforced, the connection between race and sex segregation
in public education shifted, but some jurisdictions still used the practice of sex segregation to
express and enforce a (gendered) message of white supremacy and African-American inferiority. 
In the years after Brown, a number of the school districts ordered to end their practice of racial
segregation went to court to argue that they should be permitted to establish sex segregation in
their schools instead.  Public school officials argued in these suits that instituting sex segregation
would have the immediate effect of reshuffling white and black students into two groups of
approximately equal racial composition.  A school district with a white and a black high school,
for example, could smoothly transform its two schools into one for girls and one for boys, both of
which would be racially integrated.137
This sex-based reshuffling also had the advantage (from the school districts’ perspective)
of ensuring that white girls could remain separated from black boys despite the abolition of
legalized racial segregation.  Maintaining this separation had been one of the primary historical
justifications for racial segregation.138  It functioned as a way of degrading African-Americans:
Legal authorities sought to shield white women from black men, but never expressed concern
139 See, e.g., VICTORIA E. BYNUM, UNRULY WOMEN: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL AND SEXUAL
CONTROL IN THE OLD SOUTH 5, 9, 96-98 (1992); JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF
SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 149-50 (1985);
Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African-American Women’s History and the Metalanguage of Race,
17 SIGNS 251, 262-66 (1992); Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, RARITAN, Fall 1988, at
39, 43.
140 See, e.g., CATHERINE CLINTON, THE PLANTATION MISTRESS: WOMAN’S WORLD IN THE
OLD SOUTH 87-89, 209-10 (1982); ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION
HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 235-36, 241 (1988); GLENDA
ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY
IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, at 72, 82-83, 96 (1996); JACQUELYN DOWD HALL, REVOLT
AGAINST CHIVALRY: JESSIE DANIEL AMES AND THE WOMEN’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 149-
57 (rev. ed. 1993).
141 For a discussion of the historical origins of this term, see Hasday, supra note 137, at 1343
n.166.
142 James Jackson Kilpatrick, a white southerner, offered a typical example of this mode of
reasoning in 1962.  As he explained:
The arguments of anthropology are of interest to the South, and I would not wish to
leave any impression that would minimize their importance; the fear of ultimate
racial interbreeding, encouraged by prospective generations of desegregated and
integrated school systems, is a very real fear in the South and not an imagined one.
If these Negro characteristics are innate, the white Southerner sees nothing but
disaster to his race in risking an accelerated intermingling of blood lines.  And even
if these Negro characteristics are not innate, the white Southerner wants no intimate
association with them anyhow.  And he is determined not to let his children be guinea
pigs for any man’s social experiment.
JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION 72 (1962); see also
O.R. WILLIAMS, SR., SEGREGATION AND COMMON SENSE 166 (1961) (“The Supreme Court’s school
and other desegregation decisions are forcing the white people of this Nation to associate with the
Negro race.  Close association with each other—especially while young—is all that is necessary to
mongrelize the races.”); WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, JR., THE CASE FOR THE SOUTH 212 (1960) (“[The
white southerner] finds complete repugnance in the idea of any mixing of the races, and that is one
of his fundamental objections to racial integration in the public schools.”).  For contemporary
assessments of the political landscape in the years after Brown, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 174 (1962) (“[W]hen
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about protecting black women from white men.139  At the same time, it also served to
simultaneously honor white women and justify their confinement.140
In the years after Brown was decided, white America’s obsessive fears about interracial
sex and marriage (often pejoratively called miscegenation)141 only intensified.142  Yet the courts
the Court had just pronounced its new integration principle, . . . it was subject to scurrilous attack
by men who predicted that integration of the schools would lead directly to ‘mongrelization of the
race’ and that this was the result the Court had really willed . . . .”); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS
OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 193 (1964) (“[I]t is even more clear that racial
intermarriage—‘mongrelization’—has been the great bête noire of white southern society and one
of the chief reasons behind the resistance to school integration.”); Louis H. Pollak, The Supreme
Court and the States: Reflections on Boynton v. Virginia, 49 CAL. L. REV. 15, 45 n.79 (1961)
(“[T]he constitutional problem presented in Naim v. Naim [an interracial marriage case] is widely
thought to be so sensitive as to make hazardous any generalizations based on this unique history.”);
Andrew L. Kaufman, Book Review, 7 NAT. L.F. 154, 155 (1962) (“We may assume that the Court
would not have taken this extraordinary course of action had the main issue in the case [Naim v.
Naim] not been the explosive issue of miscegenation.”).
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reviewing the schools’ remedial strategies—after Brown but before the application of heightened
scrutiny to sex-based state action—routinely upheld sex-segregated public education, at the very
143 See United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., No. 3983, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Miss. July 14,
1970) (findings of fact and recommendations) (“[T]he Court finds that defendants have met their
burden of showing that the separation by sex plan stems from sound educational purposes as
distinguished from racially discriminatory purposes.”), ruling deferred, Nos. 28030 & 28042, slip
op. at 2 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 1970) (per curiam) (permitting sex segregation to continue); Moore v.
Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. La. 1969) (“The court recognizes that the
trend in modern education is in the other direction.  But educational decisions are for the School
Board alone.  Many school districts in this country have long operated separate schools for boys and
girls.  This educational philosophy is also practiced in many colleges and universities although their
number is decreasing every year.”), appeal dismissed at request of all parties, 421 F.2d 1407, 1407
(5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 106, 108 (E.D.
La. 1969) (“The school board offers this proposal only as a transitory measure designed to ease the
conversion to a unitary system.  For the reasons set forth in Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School
Board, supra, the Court will approve this proposal for the 1969-70 school year.”), amended on other
grounds, 316 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. La. 1970); Banks v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., No. 16173, slip
op. at 1-3 (E.D. La. June 9, 1969) (“ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant St.
James Parish School Board implement and effectuate for the 1969-70 school year its plan to effect
a unitary, non racial school system for St. James Parish. . . . All boys, grades 1-12, from Central and
Romeville will attend Central School. . . . All girls, grades 1-12, from Central and Romeville will
attend Romeville School. . . . All girls grades 5-12, formerly attending St. James High School,
Magnolia High School, Magnolia Elementary, and Consolidated Elementary will attend the St.
James High School. . . . All boys, grades 5-12, formerly attending St. James High School, Magnolia
Elementary, Consolidated Elementary will attend the Magnolia High School.”).
After the Supreme Court had applied heightened scrutiny to sex-based classifications, the
Fifth Circuit did hold that a school district could not impose mandatory sex segregation on its entire
school system as a means of remedying its former practice of racial segregation.  See United States
v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 620-25 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1977).  This decision, however,
ultimately relied on new statutory rather than new constitutional arguments.  It held that the school
district’s remedial strategy violated the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-380, 88 Stat. 514, which prohibited states from denying equal educational opportunity on the
basis of sex, see 560 F.2d at 620-25 & n.7.  In the course of this litigation, which forced the school
district to defend its use of sex segregation, the district alluded to community concerns about contact
between white girls and black boys, arguing “that it should be permitted to continue its present
modified plan because it fears that whites will leave the public school system if sex-desegregation
is implemented.”  Id. at 624.  The Fifth Circuit held that this was “an impermissible basis for
refusing to comply with the statutorily mandated scheme.”  Id.; see also Helen Dewar, Blacks
Boycott Sex-Segregated Schools, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1977, at A32, A32 (noting that, “[a]ccording
to Robert Wilson Jr., the one black member of the school board [at issue in this case], the [school
district’s sex segregation] plan was drafted in 1969 to ‘prevent black males and white females from
having any contact’ in the classrooms”); id. (reporting that black students in this school district had
begun boycotting their classes in August 1977 to protest the sex segregation); Merrill Sheils,
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same moment that they were striking down racial segregation in public schools.143  They did not 
Segregation by Sex, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 1977, at 97, 97 (“‘They never had any idea of changing
the situation,’ says Robert Wilson, the only black member of the school board.  ‘It has always been
a racial issue.  The idea is to keep the black boys from having any contact with the white girls—pure
and simple.’”); id. (“Bernard Dunaway, the board’s president, indicates that there is some truth to
Robert Wilson’s charge that whites prefer to keep the sexes separate for racial reasons.  Boys and
girls could attend school together before 1969, he explains, because ‘we had one school for whites
and another school for coloreds.’”).
144 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
145 Id. at 534.
146 See Garrett v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1005-06 (E.D.
Mich. 1991).
147 See id. at 1006 (“The Academies offer special programs including a class entitled ‘Rites
of Passage’, an Afrocentric (Pluralistic) curriculum, futuristic lessons in preparation for 21st century
careers, an emphasis on male responsibility, mentors, Saturday classes, individualized counseling,
extended classroom hours, and student uniforms.”).
In 1996, Governor Pete Wilson of California endorsed sex-segregated public education in
terms resonant with the Detroit debate.  As he explained in his State of the State Address that year:
Some cities around the nation have found success with all-male classrooms
for at-risk boys.  There, strong male teachers serve as an alternative to gang leaders.
So I propose establishing all-male Empowerment Academies as magnet
schools.  There boys can find the discipline and role models they’ll need to escape
a life on the streets.
In the same way, young girls and their parents should have the option of all-
female schools.  I’d especially like to see such a school offer girls the opportunity to
concentrate on math and science.
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see, or they did not acknowledge, the connection between race and sex.
In sum, the question of whether, when, why, and how a practice denies women “full
citizenship stature,”144 or “create[s] or perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women,”145 can easily have different answers for different populations of women.  Class and
especially race have long been embedded in the practice of sex-segregated public education, for
instance.  Indeed, in light of this history, it should not be surprising to learn that many of the
communities that have recently been most interested in establishing sex segregation in their
public schools are much less privileged than the elite groups that historically dominated single-
sex public education.  For many people, the practice of sex-segregated public education
continues to have elite connotations, and the contemporary notion that sex segregation will help
elevate communities traditionally denied elite status and privilege builds on this line of thought. 
In 1991, for example, Detroit sought to open three all-male academies for boys in elementary
school and junior high.146  The city argued that the schools would be manifestations of racial
pride and sites of heightened opportunity in a predominately African-American and poor
jurisdiction.147  These sorts of aspirations, of course, still leave plenty of room for the possibility
3 JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY: LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1995-96 REGULAR
SESSION, at 4311 (1996) (statement of Gov. Wilson).
148 See Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1014.  As the court explained:
In Mississippi v. Hogan, the Supreme Court held that exclusion of an
individual from a publicly-funded school because of his or her sex violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, unless the defendant can show the
sex-based “classification serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed’” are “substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.”
. . . .
None of the[] findings meet the defendant’s burden of showing how the
exclusion of females from the Academies is necessary to combat unemployment,
dropout and homicide rates among urban males.  There is no evidence that the
educational system is failing urban males because females attend schools with males.
In fact, the educational system is also failing females.  Thus, the Court concludes the
application of the second prong of the Hogan test to the facts at hand, makes it likely
that the plaintiffs will succeed on a constitutional argument.
Id. at 1006, 1008 (citations omitted).
After this legal defeat, the Detroit school board agreed to admit female students to the three
schools at issue in Garrett.  See CLIFFORD WATSON & GENEVA SMITHERMAN, EDUCATING AFRICAN
AMERICAN MALES: DETROIT’S MALCOLM X ACADEMY SOLUTION 49 (1996); Detroit Board Agrees
To Let Girls Attend Male-Only Academies, SCH. L. NEWS, Aug. 29, 1991, at 5, 5; Laurel Shaper
Walters, The Plight of Black Male Schools, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1991, at 8, 8.  These
schools have pursued an Afrocentric curriculum.  See WATSON & SMITHERMAN, supra, at 55 (“The
mission of the Malcolm X Academy grows out of its grounding in the pedagogy that has come to be
known as ‘African Immersion,’ or ‘Afrocentricity.’”); Kevin Bushweller, Separate by Choice, AM.
SCH. BOARD J., Oct. 1996, at 34, 36 (“In the classroom [at Detroit’s Malcolm X Academy], a red,
green, and black flag of African-American nationalism serves as yet another reminder of the
intensely racial focus of this school.”).  There is also some evidence that the schools’ primary focus
remains on male students.  See WATSON & SMITHERMAN, supra, at 24 (“Despite Judge Woods’
ruling, today in 1994, the Detroit Public Schools’ original ‘Male Academy’ concept continues
virtually in full force.  All three of Detroit’s first African-Centered Academies have annually had a
student population that is 90% or more Black male.”); Bushweller, supra, at 34 (“Even though 15
percent of the students [at Detroit’s Malcolm X Academy] are now girls, the school’s primary
mission remains helping young black males, says the school’s principal, Clifford Watson.”).
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that Detroit’s single-sex schools would have contributed to women’s inequality, and in fact a
federal court barred Detroit from opening the schools in sex-segregated form long before
Virginia was decided.148  The historical record suggests, however, that in considering the
appropriate constitutional status of schools like this under Virginia’s framework, a Court could
149 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
150 Id. at 532, 534.
151 Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (rejecting equal protection challenge to
Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute because “nothing in the record demonstrates that this
preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted because it would
accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place in the
Massachusetts Civil Service”).
152 See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 136-142.
154 See supra text accompanying note 138.
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usefully explore the possibility that whether, when, why, and how a sex-segregated public school
deprives women of “full citizenship stature” may differ depending on the race, class, or other
characteristics of the women at issue.149
B. Separation Is Not the Only Mechanism for Denying Women “Full Citizenship”
and Maintaining Their “Inferiority”: The Historical Overlap Between Sex-
Segregated and Coeducational Public Education
The historical record of sex-segregated (and coeducational) public education also reveals
that separation of the sexes is not the only mechanism through which women’s “full citizenship”
can be denied and their “inferiority” maintained.150  Currently, the sex discrimination
jurisprudence, even in Virginia, focuses narrowly on separation.  State action, like sex-segregated
public education, that openly distinguishes or divides men and women is automatically subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.  But facially neutral state action, like
coeducational public education, is subject to heightened scrutiny only if the plaintiff can meet the
extraordinarily difficult burden of demonstrating the equivalent of official malice: “that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” women or men.151  This rule all but ignores
coeducational public schools as potential sources of women’s inequality, and appears to assume
that single-sex and coeducational public education are vastly different.
The focus on separation in the sex discrimination jurisprudence may reflect that case
law’s frequent reliance on analogies to race discrimination.152  The mechanism of separation has
figured very prominently in the history of race in the United States.  The very fact that whites and
blacks were kept apart, in school and especially in relations of intimacy, appears to have been
among the most important means through which white supremacy was expressed and enforced. 
Recall, for instance, the many school districts that were convinced that one of the most effective
ways they could preserve racial hierarchy after Brown was by separating black boys from white
girls.153  This is not to say that white supremacy has always been maintained through the
mechanism of separation.  One important historical expression of white privilege, for instance,
was the legal protection that white men enjoyed in seeking sexual access to black women.154  But
155 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532, 534.
156 Id.
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in general, the history of race discrimination often focuses our attention on separation as the
means by which unequal citizenship and legalized inferiority can be sustained.
The history of sex-segregated and coeducational public education, however, helps us see
another powerful mechanism by which “full citizenship” can be denied and “legal, social, and
economic inferiority” preserved.155  This mechanism might be called “sex role confinement.” 
One common feature of the practice of sex-segregated public education through at least the mid-
part of the twentieth century, one way it functioned to deny equal status to even the elite white
women most privileged by the system, was by steering women toward marriage, motherhood,
and a small number of poorly compensated jobs, and leaving them without the resources to make
any other choices.  This had dignitary consequences; it was premised on the view that women
were not suited to assume a prominent part in the nation’s public or economic life.  It also caused
women to suffer real material harm by depriving them of the training and connections that they
needed to pursue such opportunities.
This role confinement, however, did not depend on separation.  In fact, it was evident in
approximately equal degree in the coeducational public schools of the period.  Coeducational
public schools brought the sexes together, but they maintained role differentiation and
confinement and a focus on educating women for marriage and maternity.  Sex-segregated public
schools, in turn, separated students by sex, yet always operated on the premise that men’s and
women’s lives were intimately intertwined.
This feature of the historical record can inform an inquiry into the appropriate
constitutional regulation of sex-segregated public education under Virginia’s framework in at
least three ways.  First, this record suggests that it would be wise for a Court deciding whether to
absolutely prohibit sex-segregated public schooling—a question the Court has been unable to
resolve—to compare the practice of sex-segregated public education to that of coeducational
public education.  Presumably, a Court would be unwilling to find coeducational public
schooling categorically unconstitutional.  But as we will discover, the historical record reveals
that differences of form like that between sex-segregated and coeducational public education can
actually prove relatively unimportant in terms of their substantive impact on women’s status.  If
the two forms of public education are operating with equal effect to maintain women’s unequal
status, moreover, it is difficult to see why a constitutional jurisprudence determined to protect
women’s equal citizenship would want to draw such an absolute line based on the form of public
education, or how prohibiting all single-sex public schools and having all public school students
attend coeducational institutions would further women’s “full citizenship stature” or combat their
“inferiority.”156  At the least, the case would need to be made.
Second, this record suggests that if sex-segregated public education is not found
categorically unconstitutional under Virginia’s framework, a Court deciding what constitutional
regulations would best prevent single-sex public schools from operating to deny women equal
status should consider the potential problem of role confinement.  Requiring single-sex public
schools to comply with separate but equal standards, moreover, may not necessarily be sufficient
157 In the 1901-1902 school year, for example, Louisville, Kentucky devoted more money to
its white high school students than it spent on the Central Colored High School, which was
coeducational and received $41.35 per student.  See Reports of the Louisville School Board for the
Years 1901-1902 and 1902-1903, supra note 128, at 247.  But the city also spent much more on the
high schools for white boys ($99.42 per student at the Manual Training High School and $71.03 per
student at the Male High School), than it spent on the high school for white girls ($41.75 per student
at the Female High School).  See id.
158 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532, 534.
159 Id.
160 See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901(a), 86 Stat. 235, 373
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000)).
161 See id. § 901(a)(1).
162 Id. § 901(a)(5).
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to counter this problem.  Women’s public schools, for example, have historically been
underfunded compared to men’s public schools.157  But it is not at all clear what equal funding
would have done to stop the system of sex-segregated public education from steering women
toward marriage and maternity and away from any alternate or additional life paths.  Indeed, as
we will see, the history of coeducational public education vividly illustrates that this kind of role
confinement can flourish even in schools where female and male students officially have access
to the same resources and the same curriculum.
Third, this historical record suggests that a Court determined to safeguard women’s “full
citizenship” and fight their “inferiority” would be well-advised to focus much more
constitutional scrutiny on coeducational public schools directly, examining them as potential
sources of women’s unequal status that may require more regulation for that reason.158  This last
point is one that the Court may be especially unlikely to pursue.  Virginia, after all, expresses no
willingness to extend its reasoning to facially neutral state action.  But the historical record
explored here could also inform a legislative inquiry into how best to regulate coeducational
public education so that it does not deprive women of “full citizenship stature” or “create or
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”159
In Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, for example, Congress prohibited
schools that receive federal funding from discriminating based on sex.160  This statute provides
Congress with a relatively straightforward means of reaching a vast array of institutions—sex-
segregated and coeducational.  As it now stands, Title IX’s only relationship to history appears in
a provision that privileges sex-segregated public colleges if they participated in the historical
practice of sex segregation.  Title IX denies funding to sex-segregated vocational schools,
professional schools, graduate schools, and public colleges.161  But it permits funding to go to
sex-segregated public colleges that have “traditionally and continually” excluded students of one
sex.162  It is not clear why a statute concerned with combating sex discrimination should favor
public colleges that have long been sex-segregated; the historical practice of sex-segregated
public education in the United States was entangled in the maintenance of women’s unequal
163 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
164 In 1890, women constituted 65.5% of all teachers in the public elementary and high
schools of the United States.  This figure rose to 70.1% in 1900, 78.9% in 1910, and 85.9% in 1920.
See FRANK M. PHILLIPS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BULL. NO. 38, STATISTICAL SURVEY OF
EDUCATION, 1921-1922, at 4 tbl.5 (1925).  On the almost universal practice of paying women
teachers much less than their male counterparts, see, for example, JOEL PERLMANN & ROBERT A.
MARGO, WOMEN’S WORK?: AMERICAN SCHOOLTEACHERS, 1650-1920, at 33 (2001) (“In New York
state, in the mid-1840s, women’s wages averaged $5.55 in the summer session and $6.98 in the
winter session, while men received $13.61 and $14.06 respectively, producing female-to-male wage
ratios of 0.425 for the summer and 0.496 for the winter session.”); id. at 116, 117 tbl.5.1 (“We have
. . . collected teacher lists from three cities: Grand Rapids, Michigan [from 1880 to 1903]; Portland,
Oregon [from 1878 to 1906]; and Paterson, New Jersey [from 1875 to 1910]. . . . The lowest ratio
of female-to-male salaries occurred in Paterson: there female personnel were paid, on average, 42
cents for every dollar earned by male personnel.  The salary ratio was a bit higher in Grand Rapids
(0.47) and significantly greater in Portland (0.55) . . . .”); Horace Mann, Eleventh Annual Report of
the Secretary of the Board of Education, in ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION, TOGETHER WITH THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD
21, 26 (Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 1848) (“Now, the average wages of male teachers [in
Massachusetts], last year, inclusive of their board, was $32 46, and the average wages of female
teachers, also inclusive of board, was $13 60 . . . . Such is the economy of employing female
teachers, whom the Normal Schools have done so much, and are capable of doing so much more,
to qualify.”); Keith E. Melder, Woman’s High Calling: The Teaching Profession in America,
1830-1860, 13 AM. STUD. 19, 22 (1972) (“Connecticut in 1838 . . . paid men exclusive of board
$14.50 per month, women $5.75.  In Ashtabula County, Ohio, the average male wage was recorded
as $14 per month, while females took home $1.25 each week.  In the same year Massachusetts
school returns indicated . . . an average salary of $23.10 a month for men, $6.49 for women,
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citizenship.  Yet the historical record does suggest that Congress’s concern under Title IX could
usefully extend beyond the question of sex segregation.  Most notably, Congress could usefully
devote particular attention to the potential problem (in both coeducational and single-sex public
schools) of role confinement.
Let’s examine the record.
The practice of sex-segregated public education as it existed in the United States through
at least the middle of the twentieth century was systematically structured to direct women to
marriage, motherhood, and a narrow range of low-wage, low-status market work, and to restrict
women’s opportunities for prominent participation in economic or political affairs.  This was
accomplished in several different ways.
Some of the strategies were located in the women’s public schools.  A number of these
schools were designed to prepare women for female-dominated employment characterized by
poor pay and little chance of advancement.  The women’s public high schools in Boston and
Philadelphia,163 for instance, trained women for public school teaching, a job category that was
becoming increasingly occupied by women as its wages and status declined.164  Other institutions
excluding board.  Pennsylvania . . . recorded wages of $18.50 per month for males, $11.30 for
females.”); Jo Anne Preston, Feminization of an Occupation: Teaching Becomes Women’s Work
in Nineteenth-Century New England 36 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University)
(on file with author) (“The average female summer wages for ten selected Massachusetts towns [in
1833-1834] . . . were one-third to one-half of the average male wages.  Although there existed
substantial differences in wage ratios between towns, the women’s average wage was never more
than 50% of the male average in any particular town.”).
165 Winifred Richmond, Present Practices and Tendencies in the Secondary Education of
Girls, 23 PEDAGOGICAL SEMINARY 184, 187 (1916) (quoting “[a] recent letter from the principal”);
see also Dora Wells, The Lucy Flower Technical High School, 22 SCH. REV. 611, 611, 614 (1914)
(“If a girl [at the Lucy L. Flower Technical High School for girls in Chicago] finds that her interest
lies in cookery she may fit herself to assist in managing a lunchroom or an institutional kitchen or
may make a beginning at general catering.”).
166 See LEWIS, supra note 107, at 349 (“The course of the [female high] school is very similar
to that of the male high school, but substitutes for Greek something in the way of what is usually
denominated ornamental education.”); see also REPORT OF THE MALE HIGH SCHOOL LOUISVILLE,
KY. FOR THE SCHOOL YEAR 1907-08, at 15 (1908) (“Our graduates are in Harvard, Yale, Princeton,
Columbia, and many other institutions, where they have entered without a condition. . . . About fifty
per cent of the graduating class usually goes either to a scientific, classical, law or medical college.”).
167 See Richmond, supra note 164, at 187 (quoting “[a] recent letter from the principal”).
168 THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
TO THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 84 (Baltimore, Bull & Tuttle 1860); see also
Baltimore Public Schools, supra note 105, at 103 (noting that “the modern foreign languages, with
Greek and Latin, are omitted in the female high schools” of Baltimore).
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trained their students for traditionally female jobs associated with even less money and prestige. 
The public high school for white women in Louisville, Kentucky, for example, offered its
students a class “‘in Vocational Cooking,’” “‘designed to prepare a girl for lunch-room
management, catering, etc.’”165
Sometimes, moreover, women’s public schools just trained women for marriage itself. 
Louisville’s Female High School, for instance, did not offer the college preparatory classes
available to the city’s white male high school students.166  But it did supplement its class in
vocational cooking with courses in household cooking, drawing, sewing, and millinery.167 
Similarly, the Board of Commissioners for the public schools of Baltimore provided no college
preparation at its high schools for white girls.  As it explained, these female students were “in
preparation for a different sphere of life,” in which “[t]he circle of their operations” would “be
circumscribed by the domestic relations,” so that women remained outside “the arena of public
action” and “in the quiet seclusion of home.”168  The president of the Mississippi Industrial
Institute and College described his institution in related terms in 1887, reporting that the school
169 MAYES, supra note 126, at 252 (quoting report of President Richard W. Jones to the Board
of Trustees (Dec. 1887)).
170 Id. (quoting report of President Richard W. Jones to the Board of Trustees (Dec. 1887));
see also George Duke Humphrey, Public Education for Whites in Mississippi, 3 J. MISS. HIST. 26,
32 (1941) (“During the first fifteen years [of the Mississippi Industrial Institute and College], many
of the courses in the college department were on a high school level.”).
171 See LAYING OF THE CORNER-STONE OF THE WINTHROP NORMAL AND INDUSTRIAL
COLLEGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA AT ROCK HILL, S.C. MAY 12, 1894 THE EIGHTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY OF
HON. ROBERT C. WINTHROP 14 (Lancaster, Enterprise Publishing Co. n.d.).
172 See supra note 117.
173 LAYING OF THE CORNER-STONE OF THE WINTHROP NORMAL AND INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE
OF SOUTH CAROLINA AT ROCK HILL, S.C. MAY 12, 1894 THE EIGHTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY OF HON.
ROBERT C. WINTHROP, supra note 170, at 26 (quoting introductory address of Governor Tillman).
174 Id. (quoting introductory address of Governor Tillman).
175 Id. at 28 (quoting introductory address of Governor Tillman).
176 Id. at 27 (quoting introductory address of Governor Tillman).
177 See Modern Ideas Followed in Building New High School, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1903, at
28, 28; R.K., Old School: Famous, Infamous and Now a Landmark, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1994, §
13, at 6, 6.
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was “‘not teaching woman to demand the ‘rights’ of men nor to invade the sphere of men.’”169 
Instead, the women’s college was training its female students “‘for the ways of modest
usefulness, for works of true benevolence,’” which would invest them “‘with that true womanly
character and those beautiful Christian graces that constitute [woman] the charm of social life
and the queen of home.’”170  The chairman of the Board of Trustees for the Winthrop Normal and
Industrial College,171 a public school for white women in South Carolina,172 echoed these
sentiments in 1894.  As he assured the audience at the ceremony for laying Winthrop’s
cornerstone, “‘[w]oman’s special province in life is that of a home-maker.’”173  “‘It is to fit
women to be mothers—high, noble, properly-trained mothers, the natural and proper guardians
of children, that this school is founded.’”174  The school would “‘never send forth or harbor one
of these ‘horrid’ creatures,’”175 the “‘strong minded, bold, brazen, pert, self-asserting female,
prating of ‘woman’s rights,’ ‘man’s tyranny and selfishness,’ the ‘degradation of nursing
children,’ and so on, ad nauseam.’”176
These same structuring principles were visible in women’s public schools outside the
South as well.  For instance, at the Wadleigh High School for Girls, a public school in New York
City,177 students had no opportunity to take classes in Latin or Greek, often crucial for college
admission in the period.  But pupils were required to take two years each of “[d]omestic science
and domestic art,” and one year each of “‘household arithmetic,’” “hygiene and sanitation,
178 BENJAMIN R. ANDREWS, U.S. BUREAU OF EDUCATION, BULL. NO. 37, EDUCATION FOR THE
HOME 96 (1914).
179 See Wells, supra note 164, at 611.
180 Id. at 614.
181 See 21 THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA: A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES,
LITERATURE AND GENERAL INFORMATION 369-70 (11th ed. 1911).
182 WILLIAM D. LEWIS, DEMOCRACY’S HIGH SCHOOL 68 (Henry Suzzallo ed., 1914).
183 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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household management, ‘social efficiency,’ and ‘essentials of conduct.’”178  At the Lucy L.
Flower Technical High School, a public women’s school in Chicago,179 “[t]he two years of
required study of the arts of homemaking . . . rest[ed] upon belief in the imperative necessity of
training girls for the profession of homemaker.”180  The principal of the William Penn High
School, a public women’s school in Philadelphia,181 was similarly convinced that “[t]he most
fundamental of all functions of woman is that of motherhood.  But the instincts that make her
play house, tend dolls, and sacrifice for her children need to be educated and trained before she
can do her best in the bearing and rearing of the race.”182
Of course, it was not the case that employers in this era were anxious to hire women for a
wide array of remunerative and rewarding occupations, or that society in general was eager to
smooth women’s path to securing economic and political power.  But there is a persistent
tendency in legal and popular discourse, evident in some of the modern jurisprudence on sex-
segregated public education and visible in many other arenas as well,183 to explain the positions
that women have occupied as the products purely of custom and tradition, long agreed to by
women and men alike.  Yet it was not simply custom and social expectations that functioned to
confine women to relatively few life paths.  Women’s public schools, created and run by states,
localities, and laws, pushed women toward a narrowly defined set of roles, without providing
them with the resources and tools that they needed to pursue other paths.  These schools helped
to create expectations about women’s life choices and possibilities, to enforce them, and to make
their consequences more powerful and important.
The customs and expectations about women’s roles that did exist, moreover, were hardly
uncontested.  Public jurisdictions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries prevented women
from entering men’s public schools, in the face of women’s determined efforts to win admission. 
Indeed, women’s exclusion from many of the public schools that prepared men for privileged
participation in political and economic life was probably at least as important a factor in
maintaining the disabling effects of sex-segregated public education for women, as any feature of
the women’s public schools.
This exclusion inflicted injuries on women that were both dignitary and material: The
men’s public schools repeatedly declared that women were unsuited for professional and political
success and never would or should attain it, and simultaneously denied women the resources
required to pursue such opportunities.  In 1858, for instance, a group of women attempted to gain
184 In March of 1858, Sarah Burger notified the University of Michigan’s Board of Regents
that she and eleven other women would be applying for admission in the coming June.  See
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, REGENTS’ PROCEEDINGS WITH APPENDIXES AND INDEX, 1837-1864, at
732 (1915) (Mar. 25, 1858) (“A communication was received from Miss Sarah E. Burger stating that
a class of 12 young ladies would present themselves for admission as students in the University in
June next.  Laid on the table.”); 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 526-27 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton
et al. eds., Ayer Co. 1985) (1886).  Burger, a young secondary school student living in Ann Arbor,
had organized this group after a woman’s rights convention left her convinced “‘that the Michigan
University as well as all others, should be opened to girls, and that women themselves should first
move in the matter.’”  Id. at 527 (quoting Sarah Burger).  Burger and her allies promptly applied for
admission in June.  See UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, supra, at 743 (June 22, 1858) (“A
communication was received from Miss S.J. Burger and Miss H.A. Patton of Ann Arbor, asking for
admission to the University.  A similar request was received from Miss. A.J. Chapin, of Lansing.”).
185 Specifically, the Michigan Regents
Resolved, That to adapt the University to the education of both sexes would
require such a revolution in the management and conduct of the Institution that we
think it wiser, under all the circumstances both in respect to the interests of the
University and the interests of the young ladies, that their application should not be
granted and that at present it is inexpedient to introduce this change into the
Institution.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, supra note 183, at 759 (Sept. 29, 1858).
186 Id. at 788 (Report on the Admission of Females, Submitted September 29, 1858).
187 Mary-Cooke Branch Munford organized the first systematic campaign to win white
women’s admission to the University of Virginia in 1910, establishing the “Coördinate College
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admission to the University of Michigan, the most prominent public university in the Midwest.184 
The school rejected the women’s applications,185 stressing the broad consensus it had found
among leading male educators
That an University contemplates the education of candidates for professional and
public life, which is not the end of female education.  That a different end requires
different means; that the effects of such a system upon young ladies would
probably be to give them false ideas of life in general and of their particular
sphere, than which nothing could be more injurious in the forming stage of
character.  That young men would be likely to lose in a corresponding ratio in
proper sense of the dignity of their own pursuits.186
Similarly, a group of women in the 1910s campaigned for the establishment of a white
women’s coordinate college at the University of Virginia, the leading public university in the
South.187  This college would not have operated coeducational classes or educational programs,188
League” and recruiting a dedicated core of volunteers.  See, e.g., Letter from Mary-Cooke Branch
Munford, Coördinate College League, to E.A. Alderman, University of Virginia 1 (Dec. 15, 1915)
(on file with author; Alderman Library, University of Virginia); WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE, SUNRISE
IN THE SOUTH: THE LIFE OF MARY-COOKE BRANCH MUNFORD 107 (1942).
188 The very word “‘co-education,’” “‘next to Woman’s Suffrage,’” was enough, a prominent
member of the Coördinate College League once explained, to leave Virginia’s legislators “‘scared
. . . to death.’”  BOWIE, supra note 186, at 140 (quoting Letter from Mrs. Norman Randolph to Mary-
Cooke Branch Munford (1914)).
189 In 1894, for instance, the Virginia faculty and the university’s Board of Visitors
emphatically rebuffed a faculty committee’s recommendation that the school accept female students
on the same terms as men.  See 13 University of Virginia, Minutes of the Faculty 384, 386 (May 12,
1894) (on file with author; Alderman Library, University of Virginia); 6 University of Virginia,
Minutes of the Rector and Board of Visitors 379-81 (June 11, 1894) (on file with author; Alderman
Library, University of Virginia).  The faculty members who supported women’s exclusion predicted
that admitting female students to the University of Virginia would undermine “[t]he exalted position
which matrons and daughters have long held and still hold in our social organization,” explaining
that “[t]he scheme of coeducation strikes at the very root of this prized form of society, and tends
to subvert what we cherish as most excellent in our homes.”  13 University of Virginia, Minutes of
the Faculty 417 (June 4, 1894) (on file with author; Alderman Library, University of Virginia).
Women who attended the University of Virginia would, they warned, “become familiar, boisterous,
bold in manners, often rudely aggressive, and ambitiously competitive with men, thus producing,
in general, a type of womanhood from which we devoutly pray to be spared.”  Id. at 416.
190 See, e.g., Mary C.B. Munford & Virginia S. McKenney, A Plea for Co-ordination, 7
ALUMNI BULL. U. VA. 4, 6-7, 9 (1914).  The League’s arguments in favor of its plan were
accordingly able to stress its relative moderation.  Indeed, Munford very deliberately attempted to
win allies among the many powerful opponents of coeducation in Virginia by characterizing the
coordinate college as a less radical means of diffusing women’s protests.  “[C]o-education,” she
warned, “will be inevitable, unless Virginia women are given opportunities absolutely equal to those
afforded Virginia men.”  WHY A CO-ORDINATE COLLEGE AT CHARLOTTESVILLE AFFILIATED WITH
THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA RATHER THAN A SEPARATE COLLEGE 6 (n.d.).
191 Munford and her League had the support and the political skills needed to prod the
legislature, which met every other year, into considering their proposal at five consecutive sessions
starting in 1910.  See Almost a Victory, HARPER’S WKLY., Apr. 11, 1914, at 5, 5; Co-ordinate Bill
Wins in Senate by Big Majority, TIMES DISPATCH (Richmond), Mar. 11, 1914, at 1, 1; Orie Latham
Hatcher, The Virginia Man and the New Era for Women, 106 NATION 650, 651 (1918); House
Postpones College Measure, TIMES DISPATCH (Richmond), Jan. 21, 1912, at 1, 1; House Rejects
Woman’s College Bill, 48 to 46, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 1916, at 1, 1; Lewis H.
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which the University of Virginia had rejected vehemently in the past,189 but it would have given
white women access to the flagship university’s faculty, library, laboratories, and other
resources.190  The Virginia legislature, however, refused to open even a coordinate college for
white women at the University of Virginia.191  As one male activist against the coordinate college
Machen, The Woman’s College, TIMES DISPATCH (Richmond), Jan. 21, 1912, at 4, 4.  But they
lacked the political power, and the legal rights, necessary to win their campaign.  In 1916, the League
came as close to victory as it ever would.  The Virginia Senate passed a bill that year to establish a
coordinate college, which failed in the Virginia House by only two votes.  See JOURNAL OF THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, SESSION WHICH COMMENCED AT THE STATE CAPITOL ON
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1916, at 947-48 (1916) (Mar. 7, 1916); House Rejects Woman’s College
Bill, 48 to 46, supra, at 1; Open Letter from Mary-Cooke Branch Munford, Chairman Central
Committee, Coördinate College League 1 (Mar. 14, 1916) (on file with author; Alderman Library,
University of Virginia).
192 Edwin F. Surber, The Education of Women, TIMES DISPATCH (Richmond), Jan. 16, 1914,
at 4, 4.
193 Letter from Arthur Lefrin to J.M. Page, University of Virginia 2 (Aug. 14, 1914) (on file
with author; Alderman Library, University of Virginia).
194 Carl Degler, for instance, stresses what he calls “the decision to include girls in primary
and secondary schooling on a par with boys.”  Carl N. Degler, What the Women’s Movement Has
Done to American History, in A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE IN THE ACADEMY: THE DIFFERENCE IT
MAKES 67, 74 (Elizabeth Langland & Walter Gove eds., 1981).  Similarly, Thomas Woody’s classic
history of women’s education explains that:
Any wide acceptance of coeducation in practice had obviously to wait upon more
general approval of the idea that girls should have more than rudimentary education.
Hence the first academies and high schools, insofar as they promoted the educational
interests of women, had to do it on the separate plan.  The high schools, once under
way, soon changed, however, and became chiefly coeducational.  They benefitted by
the great faith in girls’ education that was gradually built up by the seminaries from
the middle of the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth centuries.  Believing in
equal education for their sons and daughters, communities began to seek an
institution to offer it.
2 THOMAS WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN’S EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 228 (1929); see
also HELEN LEFKOWITZ HOROWITZ, ALMA MATER: DESIGN AND EXPERIENCE IN THE WOMEN’S
COLLEGES FROM THEIR NINETEENTH-CENTURY BEGINNINGS TO THE 1930S, at 85-86 (1984) (“As one
of the early women graduates of the University of Michigan . . . , Alice Freeman had experienced
the unique independence of that pioneer coeducational university.  In the first years of coeducation,
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explained, “higher education unfits [woman] for domestic employment.”192  Admitting women to
the University of Virginia, another man similarly warned, would be “quite tragical,” for it would
lead women to “imagine that they will be permanently superior to the callow class mates
surpassed by them in college; and so plan lives tending to independence of and competition with
men.”193
Historical accounts of the rise of coeducation in public education often envision
coeducation as an important break from the patterns established in sex-segregated education.194 
the university allowed women the complete freedom of men, letting them attend all classes (except
in the Medical College) and live in boarding houses without supervision.”).  For an example of the
influence of this historical view in the legal literature, see Morgan, supra note 80, at 386 (“[B]y the
1890s it was widely accepted that schools should offer essentially the same curriculum to both boys
and girls and educate children of both sexes together.”).
195 Some historians, for example, have suggested that southern states in the late nineteenth
century may have passed laws requiring racial segregation in public transportation in part because
they recognized that railroad lines, steamboat operators, and other common carriers were not
consistently willing to bear the expense of providing wholly separate accommodations for whites
and blacks unless compelled to do so by legislation.  See Welke, supra note 131, at 266-67 (“[Case]
law and their own financial interest led carriers to allow respectable women of color to ride in first-
class ladies’ accommodations.  By the late 1880s and early 1890s it had become clear that the wall
guarding Southern white woman’s sacred place—and hence white supremacy—was not secure in
the hands of carriers and courts.  Southern state legislatures quickly moved to impose absolute racial
separation first on railroads and then on other carriers not only to control the region’s black
population, but also to force common carriers and Southern courts into line.”); id. at 312 (“Those
in power in the South adopted statutory Jim Crow beginning in the 1890s because . . . [inter alia]
carriers in allowing respectable black women to ride in first-class ladies’ accommodations were
themselves failing to protect the purity of white womanhood.  Seen in this light, the shift to statutory
Jim Crow not only was necessary to control Southern blacks, but also to force common carriers . . .
into line.”).
In the first half of the twentieth century, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) recognized that southern states and localities were able to afford racially
segregated public institutions only because they spent so few resources on the schools and other
public facilities for African-Americans.  One early strategy that the NAACP devised was to bankrupt
these southern jurisdictions through litigation that actually forced them to comply with rigorous
separate but equal standards in their segregated institutions.  See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 12-13 (1994); see
also id. at 117 (“In 1941 the United States Office of Education reported that it would cost the South
about $26 million a year to equalize teachers’ salaries, and another $9 million to equalize student-
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Yet the two forms of public schooling were much closer in function and effect than one might
initially suppose and has frequently been assumed.  Coeducation became the dominant form of
public education in the United States by the late nineteenth century, but not because most public
jurisdictions were committed to providing women with the same life choices, prospects, and
possibilities open to men.  To the contrary, the decisionmakers and advocates behind
coeducational public schools were often explicitly determined to maintain and enforce sex roles
that confined women to marriage and motherhood and directed men to economic and political
success.
The practicalities of organizing a status regime can affect how it develops and can cause
it to change in form.  Segregating public institutions is necessarily an expensive proposition,
unless jurisdictions are willing to exclude one group completely.195  In this case, the cost of sex-
teacher ratios in black and white schools.”).
196 Many state universities south of the Mason-Dixon line and east of the Mississippi River
were sex-segregated in this period.  In 1907, for example, only the Universities of Alabama,
Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee and West Virginia admitted both men and
women.  See Charles R. Van Hise, Educational Tendencies in State Universities, 34 EDUC. REV. 504,
511 (1907).  A federal survey conducted in 1882 found that 19 out of 196 cities and large towns were
operating sex-segregated public schools.  See U.S. BUREAU OF EDUCATION, CIRCULAR OF
INFORMATION NO. 2-1883, COEDUCATION OF THE SEXES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE UNITED
STATES 12 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1883).  The nineteen jurisdictions were
heavily concentrated in the South and Northeast: Mobile, Alabama; Wilmington, Delaware; Macon,
Georgia; Belleville, Illinois; New Orleans, Louisiana; Baltimore, Maryland; Marblehead,
Massachusetts; Newburyport, Massachusetts; Vicksburg, Mississippi; New Brunswick, New Jersey;
Brooklyn, New York; Allentown, Pennsylvania; Easton, Pennsylvania; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania;
York, Pennsylvania; Charleston, South Carolina; Knoxville, Tennessee; Austin, Texas; and
Alexandria, Virginia.  See id. at 24; see also Richmond, supra note 164, at 185 (“In 1914, according
to the Commissioner’s report, there were 28 of these [public women’s high] schools, which were
distributed as follows: Massachusetts, 4; New York, 4; Pennsylvania, 5; Maryland, 4; South
Carolina, 1; Georgia, 4; Louisiana, 2; Kentucky, 1; Illinois, 1; and California, 2.  The total number
of girls in these schools was 34,362.  The two States of New York and Pennsylvania have over 60
per cent. of the entire number, while if we include Massachusetts and Maryland the four have over
80 per cent.”).
197 The economic motivations behind admitting women to schools with men are easiest to see
in the public universities of the Midwest, where the traditions of sex segregation were less
entrenched than in the East or South but still stronger than in the developing West.  As the University
of Wisconsin’s president later explained, “[t]he western states in these early days were too poor to
support two high-grade educational institutions.”  Van Hise, supra note 195, at 509.  There was no
way to provide women with access to public higher education “but to adopt coeducation, and this
was the solution which was gradually forced upon the older state universities of the middle west.”
Id.  If nothing else, one president of the University of Iowa also reasoned, “then one strong plea may
be made for coeducational colleges on the score of economy.  Duplication of all essential equipments
. . . can hardly be justified.”  J.L. Pickard, Coeducation in Colleges, 13 EDUC. 259, 265-66 (1893).
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segregated schooling importantly drove the rise of public coeducation.  For jurisdictions, like
those in the South and Northeast, intent on using sex segregation in public education as an
expression of racial or economic privilege, as well as gender status, sex segregation represented
money well spent.196  But for states, cities, and towns not as interested in reinforcing race or class
divides in their public educational systems, sex segregation was often too expensive and too
elaborate an expression of gender norms.197  These jurisdictions could easily structure their
coeducational schools to maintain men’s and women’s status in virtually the same way that sex-
segregated public institutions did, without having to bear the cost of complete sex segregation.
Like their single-sex counterparts, coeducational public schools employed a number of
different mechanisms.  Sometimes, coeducational public schools formally segregated a portion of
198 Lillian Moller Gilbreth, in THERE WAS LIGHT: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A UNIVERSITY,
BERKELEY: 1868-1968, at 83, 84-85 (Irving Stone ed., 1970); see also id. at 449 (providing
biographical information about Gilbreth).  In 1916, Oscar M. Voorhees, the secretary of Phi Beta
Kappa’s National Council, proposed altering the organization’s rules to make it more difficult for
female college students to gain admission.  As he explained, election to Phi Beta Kappa was
determined “on the basis of grades only.”  Oscar M. Voorhees, Proceedings of the Twelfth National
Council, 3 PHI BETA KAPPA KEY 8, 20 (1916).  Under this system, however, “the number of
undergraduate women elected nearly equaled the number of men,” and “[m]any chapters elect[ed]
each year more women than men.”  Id.  Voorhees was concerned that “some of our chapters” did not
have “the highest reputation by reason of the preponderance of women,” and concluded that
“election on the basis of grades only has . . . been pushed to the extreme.”  Id.  As he reasoned, “[t]he
way must be kept open to the men, and promising students be encouraged to seek membership.  In
my opinion there are other marks in undergraduates of the promise of usefulness than mere grades.”
Id.  Phi Beta Kappa’s president quickly appointed a committee to study the matter.  See id. at 33-34.
199 U.S. BUREAU OF EDUCATION, BULL. NO. 31, SPECIAL FEATURES IN CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS
52 (1913) (quoting G.H. Landgraf, superintendent of city schools).  The Broadway High School in
Seattle, Washington also segregated some of its science classes by sex, along with some of its classes
in English, math, history, Latin, French, Spanish, German, commercial work, and manual training.
See Thomas R. Cole, Segregation at the Broadway High School, Seattle, 23 SCH. REV. 550, 551 tbl.I
(1915).  One teacher, who approved of the arrangement, explained its advantages this way in 1915:
“In physics, I have been able to leave out much of the most difficult part for
the girls and do more extensive work in the parts in which they are naturally most
interested.  The work of the boys has been made to include a great deal that I have
never found time to touch in mixed classes.  I would say that boys have done 30 to
40 per cent more work than in mixed classes.  The brighter girls have probably lost
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their classes or programs along sex lines as a way of directing students to life paths associated
with their sex (or their sex and race) and keeping them from resources and opportunities that
might have made deviation more possible.  In the early twentieth century, for instance, the
University of California at Berkeley barred female students from admission to Phi Beta Kappa,
the most prestigious academic honor society, reasoning that “‘when it came to finding a good
job, men needed the help of this honor more than women did.’”198  With a similar division of life
roles in mind, Marinette, Wisconsin’s coeducational public high school began segregating its
classes in physics and chemistry by sex in 1912.  As the superintendent of the city’s schools
explained, the physics and chemistry classes limited to male students were “‘technical and
mathematical’” and “‘‘scientific,’’” deliberately designed to prepare men for “‘scientific and
engineering courses in the colleges and universities’” and careers “‘in the arts and industries.’” 
In contrast, “‘[t]he course in physics given to the girls’ classes [was] largely informational and
cultural and less technical.’”  The only chemistry classes open to female students, in turn, were
“‘built up largely around the chemistry of the home, of cooking, food values, and adulterations
and their detection.’”199
the fund of outside information, applications, etc., that the boys contribute to the
recitation.”
Id. at 553; see also Richmond, supra note 164, at 187 (reporting in 1916 that sex-segregated classes
operated in coeducational public schools “in Seattle, Washington; in Fresno, California; in
Muskogee, Oklahoma; in Richmond, Indiana; the Englewood High School, in Chicago; the high
schools in Columbus, Ohio, and in Hackensack, New Jersey, the Junior High School in Clinton,
Iowa” and noting that “[o]f these 8 schools, 4 separate the classes in science; 3 in physiology,
physical culture, and manual training, either through all or a part of the course; 2 separate in
drawing”).
200 Maud E. Hayes et al., Budgets in a Home Management Course for a Senior High School,
20 J. HOME ECON. 75, 75-76 (1928); see also MARION TALBOT, THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN 152-53
(1910) (“[I]n the Chicago Public Schools in December, 1909. . . . [a]ll girls in the elementary schools
have either domestic science or domestic arts as a requirement for graduation.”).
201 See Rosaline Ivey, Status of Home Economics in Certain Southern Accredited High
Schools 3-6, 23 (1929) (unpublished M.A. thesis, George Peabody College for Teachers) (on file
with author).
202 See Ruth Aline Patton, A Study of Home Economics in Some Negro High Schools 5-7,
26-27, 55 (1931) (unpublished M.A. thesis, George Peabody College for Teachers) (on file with
author); see also TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOR, 1910:
INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION 131-33 (1911) (“[At the Armstrong Manual Training School, a public high
school for African-American students in Washington, D.C.,] the boys uniformly [take] woodwork
. . . in the first year and forging in the second year.  The girls do plain sewing and dressmaking in the
first year and dressmaking only in the second year. . . . The laundry department prepares the girls to
do scientific laundry work, while the course in domestic science fits them for domestic service as
well as for home duties.  It is said that a number of the girls go into domestic service upon
graduation.”); Kate Brew Vaughn, Some Colored Schools of the South, 8 J. HOME ECON. 588, 588
(1916) (“Eight years ago, upon taking charge of a student body that seemed interested rather
superficially in the subjects of study, [‘[t]he principal of colored schools at Winston-Salem’] decided
to open a kitchen, a sewing room, and a laundry to fit the girls and boys for employment.  A few
boys, and fewer girls, applied.  He then required every girl to enter the classes, but the sewing classes
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Sex-segregated home economics classes in coeducational public schools were also
particularly notable for pushing female students toward home and family, while simultaneously
reflecting a particular determination to train black women for domestic service.  The public
school system in Long Beach, California, for instance, began requiring all female high school
students in 1927 to take “a course in home management” that featured the “Study of the job of
homemaking as a vocation for women.”200  A 1929 study of public high schools in eleven
southern states found that thirty percent of the surveyed schools required female students to
enroll in home economics courses.201  A survey of the black public high schools operating in ten
southern states during the 1930-1931 school year found that as many as eighty-five percent of
them had required home economics classes for female students.202
were filled and cooking and laundry classes went begging.  The School Board finally decreed that
every girl who failed to give the required amount of time to cooking, sewing, and laundry, would be
dismissed.”).
203 See ISABEL BEVIER, HOME ECONOMICS IN EDUCATION 128 (1924); see also id. (“The
proceedings of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges for 1922 includes a list of forty-one such
colleges with departments of home economics.”).
204 See 3 University of Wisconsin, Series No. 1/1/1, Board of Regents Minutes 201-02 (Jan.
21, 1874) (on file with author; University of Wisconsin-Madison Archives) (“[T]he University shall
be open to female as well as male students, with no other regulations or restriction on the part of the
Board of Regents, than those that may be deemed necessary and proper for the preservation of order
and discipline.”).
205 Van Hise, supra note 195, at 516.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 516-17.  Edwin E. Slosson similarly contended that coeducational schools like the
University of Wisconsin should promote what he called “‘natural segregation,’” by “providing
vocational courses which [will] draw women away from the liberal arts department as the
engineering courses have drawn off the men.”  Edwin E. Slosson, University of Wisconsin, 67 INDEP.
8, 22 (1909).  “[I]t is clear,” Slosson explained, “that the main business of most women is in
household administration and industries.”  Id.
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Often, however, coeducational public schools did not officially limit a class or program to
students of one sex, but utilized a variety of other means that were approximately as effective at
steering female students toward some courses, opportunities, and life paths, and away from
others.  For instance, one strategy that many coeducational public colleges and universities
employed was to establish home economics departments.  By 1905, thirty-six of the land-grant
colleges, practically every one in the North and West, had such a department.203  These
departments were usually not formally sex-segregated, but they were deliberately designed to
direct female students toward marriage and maternity and away from the courses that male
students attended and the professional preparation offered there.
Consider the University of Wisconsin, for example.  This school became formally
coeducational in 1874.204  But as the president of the university, Charles Van Hise, proudly
explained in a 1907 address, the school had nonetheless managed to orchestrate “nearly complete
segregation on a large scale by the establishment of courses and colleges which are practically for
the one sex or the other.”205  In particular, “[t]he colleges of engineering, law, commerce,
agriculture, and medicine” were “essentially men’s colleges,” although officially “open to
women.”206  To help accomplish this, the University of Wisconsin, like the universities of
Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Tennessee, and many other states, had established
“for the women” “courses for training the heads of households,” “[w]hether such courses be
called home economics, household science, or domestic science.”207  The director of the
Department of Home Economics at the University of Illinois from 1900 to 1921 similarly
reported that her department was designed to guide women away from opportunities that they
208 BEVIER, supra note 202, at 221.  Lou C. Allen, the first Professor of Domestic Science at
the University of Illinois, see id. at 124-25, described the school’s home economics department this
way: “‘The school was the outgrowth of a conviction that a rational system for the higher and better
education of women must recognize their distinctive duties as women—the mothers, housekeepers,
and health keepers of the world—and furnish instruction which shall fit them to meet these duties.’”
Id. at 126 (quoting Allen).
209 Richmond, supra note 164, at 195-96.
210 See WILLIAM WARREN FERRIER, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA 408-09, 511-13 (1930).
211 President Addresses the Women Students, DAILY CALIFORNIAN, Sept. 1, 1904, at 1, 1.  In
1900, a group of female students at the University of California had articulated a somewhat different
account of the purpose of their education.  As they explained, “[w]e come to study, to learn, to enjoy,
to meet the nicest men, to take a degree and to go forth prepared for work, in or out of the home, as
Providence decrees.”  What We Can Do, 39 OCCIDENT 233, 233-34 (1900).
212 BENJAMIN I. WHEELER, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
5 (1912).
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might have been tempted to pursue outside the home, “lured by the promise of greater freedom
and larger compensation.”208
When coeducational schools were not steering their female students toward marriage
itself, they structured their course offerings to direct women to a small number of female-
dominated jobs familiar from the curricula of many women’s public schools.  One 1914 survey,
for instance, found that the high schools in 147 cities offered the following classes, clearly
intended to occupy female students: “Cooking, 98; dressmaking, 92; sewing, 89; home
economics, 72; millinery, 71; nursing, 24; costume designing, 4; dietetics, 1; food preparation, 1;
house decoration, 1; laundering, 1.”209
Yet another strategy, less common but motivated by similar concerns, was to establish
junior colleges in an effort to keep female students away from flagship coeducational public
universities and the prestige and professional advancement offered there.  For example,
Benjamin Ide Wheeler, the president of the University of California from 1899 to 1919,210
advised his female students that they were at school “for the preparation of marriage and
motherhood.  This education should tend to make you more serviceable as wives and mothers.”211 
But Wheeler still sought to minimize female enrollment at the University of California, and
accordingly supported the establishment of a large system of junior colleges in the state on the
ground that women were “more likely [than men] to remain at home and attend the junior
college.”212
In sum, the historical record reveals that separation is not the only mechanism through
which unequal citizenship can be maintained and inferiority enforced.  Historically, role
confinement has been evident in approximately equal measure in sex-segregated and
coeducational public schools.  This suggests that a Court deciding whether sex-segregated public
education is inherently incompatible with women’s equality could usefully consider whether sex-
segregated public schools actually deny women “full citizenship stature” and “create or
213 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532, 534 (1996).
214 Id.
215 Id. (emphasis added).
216 See supra text accompanying note 80.
217 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 49, 65-73 and accompanying text.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 18-20, 47-49, 52-60.
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perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women” in a way or to a degree that
coeducational public schools do not.213  It also suggests that if sex-segregated public education is
not completely banned under Virginia’s framework, a Court determining how best to regulate
single-sex public schools so that they do not infringe upon women’s equal status would be well-
advised to pay attention to the potential problem of role confinement.  Along the same lines, a
Court seeking to effectively safeguard women’s citizenship could wisely focus much more
constitutional scrutiny on coeducational public schools directly, considering the possibility that
these schools may also need more stringent constitutional regulation to prevent them from
impinging upon women’s equality.
C. Women and Men Are Not Necessarily Interchangeable in Considering What
Denies “Full Citizenship” and Maintains “Inferiority”
Lastly, the historical record of sex-segregated public education reveals that women and
men are not necessarily interchangeable in considering whether a practice denies “full
citizenship” and maintains “inferiority.”214  Virginia seems to express a particular constitutional
concern for women’s “full citizenship stature” and “the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women.”215  This specific focus on women appears both in the opinion’s language,216 and in the
justification that Virginia offers for its suggested standard: If constitutional law has a
responsibility to safeguard and defend women’s equal citizenship because of the law’s
longstanding role in maintaining and enforcing women’s inequality,217 no historical record would
provide the same justification for committing the sex discrimination jurisprudence to the
protection of men’s equal citizenship.  At the same time, there are portions of the Virginia
opinion that appear to treat men and women interchangeably.  Virginia, for instance, makes clear
that sex-segregated public schools must, at a minimum, conform to separate but equal
requirements.  Its application of these requirements to the Virginia Military Institute, which
excluded women, is not noticeably different from the Hogan Court’s application of separate but
equal principles to the Mississippi University for Women, which excluded men.218  Certainly, the
sex discrimination jurisprudence before Virginia treats the constitutional claims of men and
women interchangeably.  Indeed, the Court has stressed that point by choosing cases with male
plaintiffs for its announcement of heightened scrutiny (Craig), and its first opinion on sex-
segregated public education (Hogan).219
220 See supra text accompanying note 156.
221 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532, 534 (1996).
222 See supra text accompanying notes 98-102, 183-192.
223 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 532, 534.
226 Id.
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The historical record of sex-segregated public education, however, reveals that what
deprives women of equal citizenship may not necessarily do the same for men.  This is one
reason, for instance, that compliance with separate but equal standards (which, as we have seen,
may not always be sufficient to protect women’s equal status)220 also may not always be needed
to safeguard “full citizenship stature” or combat “legal, social, and economic inferiority.”221 
Historically, public school systems have frequently caused women both material and dignitary
harm by denying them access to the opportunities and resources available in men’s public
schools.222  But it is not at all clear that men’s exclusion from women’s public schools (where
men had no access to the same opportunities and curricula elsewhere) has historically operated to
deprive either men or women of “full citizenship stature.”223  This does not tell us whether any
particular modern arrangement of sex-segregated public education that does not meet separate
but equal standards is still consistent with the “full citizenship stature” of women (or men).224 
But it does suggest that the importance to be placed on compliance with separate but equal
standards is something that could be the subject of particularized investigation rather than
assumption—even if the Court’s firm commitment to separate but equal principles as a required
constitutional minimum indicates that it is unlikely to do this.  More generally, this record
suggests that a Court considering whether, when, why, and how a practice denies equal
citizenship should not simply assume that the answer will be the same for women and men.
CONCLUSION
Virginia suggests that the constitutional law of sex discrimination should focus on
whether a practice denies women “full citizenship stature” or “create[s] or perpetuate[s] the legal,
social, and economic inferiority of women.”225  But the opinion does not tell us how to determine
which practices meet those criteria.  The answer to this question is hardly obvious or automatic. 
As this Article’s case study of sex-segregated public education suggests, however, a historical
record can usefully inform an inquiry into whether, when, why, and how a particular practice is
consistent with women’s equal status.  Ultimately, this project of specific application may be at
least as important as any more general constitutional commitment to protecting women’s “full
citizenship stature” and combating their “legal, social, and economic inferiority.”226  Indeed, it
may call into question many of the core assumptions of the current sex discrimination
jurisprudence.
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